'Granting the country's highest civilian honour to Prime Minister Modi was surprising as it indicated the government was going out of its way to have India as a close partner.'
"While there was initially concern that the NPP* government would lean closer towards China, India's engagement with Sri Lanka has been steadily growing since 2022," notes Dr Rajni Gamage, research fellow, Institute of South Asian Study, National University of Singapore.
Dr Gamage's main topic of research is Sri Lankan politics and development issues.
"Economic pragmatism by the government, despite past antagonism to India, was expected due to the country's fragile economic state, recognition of opportunities that lay in engaging closely with India, and shifting US relations in the Indo Pacific under Trump which is causing a lot of global volatility," Dr Gamage tells Rediff's Archana Masih in an e-mail interview.
What surprised you most about Prime Minister Modi's visit to Sri Lanka? The historic welcome? The defence treaty? Or the outreach to Mr Modi and India by President Dissanayake's government?
The granting of the Sri Lanka Mitra Vibhushana, the country's highest civilian honour to Prime Minister Modi stood out.
Previous recipients were former Maldives president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Yasser Arafat.
The past awards indicated the close relations between Maldives and Sri Lanka, and the Palestinian cause which has been an issue of Global South solidarity for several past governments, including those of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Ranasinghe Premadasa and Mahinda Rajapaksa.
Sri Lanka's relations with India are at an all-time high, and while there was initially concern that the government would lean closer towards China, due to historical antagonism towards India by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP (its main political party) and its former Marxist-Leninist ideology, India's engagement with Sri Lanka has been steadily growing since 2022.
Economic pragmatism by the government, despite past antagonism to India, was expected due to the country's fragile economic state, recognition of opportunities that lay in engaging closely with India, and shifting US relations in the Indo Pacific under Trump which is causing a lot of global volatility.
Granting the country's highest civilian honour was surprising as it indicated the government was going out of its way to have India as a close partner.
Would you have expected a government headed by the JVP, perhaps the most India hostile political entity for more than half a century in Sri Lanka, to produce such an enthusiastic response to India likely ever seen in your country? What accounts for this transformation?
The Sri Lankan government understands the precarious economic (and by extension political) situation it is in. It was voted into power by a significant mandate and has to manage high expectations, despite the economic constraints it is working within.
With what is going on in the US under President Trump, such as the 44% reciprocal tariffs on Sri Lanka the US announced, and an ongoing IMF programme, the government faces a lot of uncertainty and inexperience in navigating these tricky waters.
So, it recognises the importance of India economically, and how in the past Sri Lanka has suffered politically and economically by ignoring India's needs (such as during the J R Jayawardene government or more recently under the Mahinda Rajapaksa government).
In addition, one must recognise that China too is taking stock of the popular pushback against its large infrastructure projects that were partially blamed for the 2022 economic crisis and poor governance practices among the Sri Lankan political leadership.
So their investments are now at the smaller, community level engagement.
Do you think Colombo is weary of China's demands on repaying loans, its unwillingness to provide economic relief without asking for its pound of flesh in return? And India is more benign source of economic support, asking for not much, only for some commercial deals?
Colombo's relations with China appear to remain strong. The NPP (JVP) has had strong relations with the Communist party of China, and it could be that it is the sureness of this relationship, that enables the NPP to make strong statements in favour of India.
Perhaps it is the Sri Lankan government's close reading or a sure understanding with the Chinese government that makes it certain that a close relationship with India will not strain its relations with China. But one has to wait and see how China responds to these latest developments.
How would the agreements signed during Mr Modi's visit play out with President Dissanayake's domestic audience?
The defence treaty shows how India is proactively attempting to convert its economic leverage to security gains. There has been some pushback by the political opposition and civil society in terms of questioning the government what the defence pact entails, and demanding for more transparency and inclusivity, such as why it was entered into without adequate public consultations.
Since the details or the implications of this pact are not clear at the moment, there is no significant opposition.
It also signals at the fragmented state of the political Opposition, to be able to mobilise on these matters; and the popular economic hardships which make mobilisation on these fronts difficult. But we can expect such demands, as well as anti-India political sentiments, to come from the nationalist political camps -- the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), represented by MP Namal Rajapaksa, and the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MJP) represented by MP and media tycoon Dilith Jayaweera.
Is the defence agreement the most significant of the ten agreements for India? Was it to signal to China its proximity to a country seen in Beijing's camp through the Rajapaksa years?
The defence and power and energy-related agreements are equally important. India has been observed to generally engage in energy and connectivity projects with a geostrategic objective as foremost.
Among the energy related projects, the MoU to develop Trincomalee as an energy hub and the construction of a multiproduct pipeline is significant.
The project also involves the United Arab Emirates, a strategic partner of India's, and whose involvement may offset geopolitical tensions of engaging bilaterally and tapping into mutual strategic competencies.
The project may intensify competition between India and China, as China's State energy company Sinopec secured a deal to construct a $3.2 billion oil refinery in Sri Lanka's southern Hambantota port.
So, besides the defence pact, which the Indian side may have desired to make it very clear that it is not leaving Sri Lanka's strategic engagement up for chance, these energy projects may elicit a response from China, who is still a key economic player in the country and may see its strategic interests as being pushed beyond acceptable limits.
As we have seen in the Maldives such agreements may quickly reach its use by date with a change in government. How can the goodwill built with Sri Lanka by India through its assistance during the economic crisis be sustained?
This nature of changes in external projects with governments has been very common in Sri Lanka too, as with the Chinese-funded Port City project and the Japanese metro project, as knee jerk political reactions.
Under the current government, during the campaigns, the NPP and Presidential candidate AKD (Anura Kumar Dissanayake) promised to cancel the Adani wind power projects due to claims that it was overpriced following non-competitive bidding.
However, the current government has shown significant continuity with the past government in terms of economic policy, and despite Adani's withdrawal from the wind power project, the government has indicated that it is open to working with the entity through an open bidding process.
The Sri Lankan government had also indicated that it would continue with the Adani investment in the Colombo Port West Container Terminal, despite bribery allegations against Adani in the United States. So policy consistency can be expected to considerable extent.
For goodwill to be sustained, the benefits of the partnership need to be felt at the community level, through small scale, high impact projects. Otherwise, a disconnect may develop between large development projects and local perceptions towards India.
What did President Dissanayake mean when he said Sri Lanka would not be used by forces inimical to India?
Since the election of President Dissanayake in September 2024, we have heard this statement at least on three occasions. So, there is a clear recognition by the Sri Lankan government that this is a concern for India, and that Sri Lanka's stance is not ambiguous on this front.
Was it meant to elicit a reciprocal assurance from India that Indian territory will not be used against Sri Lanka as it was in the 1980s?
I do not think that the Sri Lankan government expects such a response due to the power differential between the two countries. But yes, a case can be made that it is eager that Indian geopolitical anxieties do not escalate, and in a way that is detrimental to Sri Lanka's interests.
The country in its weakened economic state is vulnerable to local political and security-driven instability, and the last thing the government would want is for these divisions to become serious national security threats.
*National People's Power, a leftist political alliance, currently rules Sri Lanka. It is dominated by the JVP.
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