Almost five years later, the three services have still not fully understood that joint/theatre commands are not a discussion point; they are the prime minister's diktat on a military reform measure that is in line with what armed forces around the world have implemented, points out Ajai Shukla.
India has one of the world's largest militaries, numbering about 1.4 million soldiers, sailors and airmen. It is among the most disciplined armed forces and has won accolades and acclaim across the globe for its bravery and tactical acumen.
For almost two centuries, British imperial power across Asia was backstopped by the British Indian Army.
In some of the most stirring moments in the history of war, such as the Battle of Ypres in World War I and the Burma Campaign in World War II, Indian troops snatched victory from the jaws of defeat.
Yet, to this day, India does not have a well-considered, apex-level, management structure that synergises the military's combat power during war and nurtures civil-military relations during peacetime.
Instead, relations between the generals, admirals and air marshals are rivalrous and competitive, while hostility and suspicion mark relations between the military and its civilian masters.
While this was acceptable, even convenient, during the British colonial divide-and-rule era, independent India's interests demanded more assertive management structures.
These began emerging during the country's first major security challenge: The Pakistan-backed tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947.
With Srinagar about to fall, the Cabinet decided boldly to commandeer all of India's civilian aircraft to fly troops into Kashmir.
The very next day, close to 100 Dakota aircraft landed troops in Srinagar, pushing back the tribal raiders.
India's fledgling government proved capable of snapping out of its pre-Independence, pacifist mindset and sanctioning the use of the military in a war-like situation.
India's higher defence structures were similarly tested in 1962. While records remain classified, two former defence secretaries recount that minutes of the meetings held at that time explicitly gave the army chief full authority to take whatever action he deemed fit.
At no stage was the army told what it must do.
The alleged letter from the then joint secretary, H C Sarin, which purportedly directed the army to 'throw out the Chinese', actually said they should be made to vacate our territory 'at a time and place of your choosing.'
Senior bureaucrats say that, in a crisis today, military advice would most likely be taken over civilian advice, if it were put across clearly.
After the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, had the armed forces collectively recommended concerted action against Pakistan, whether it was a hit across the border or blockading Karachi, the bureaucrats say it would have been accepted.
But when the prime ,inister specifically asked these questions, two or three days after the 26/11 strikes, the answer from the chiefs was a 'deathly silence'.
This contrasts with the received wisdom, mainly from retired senior military officers, that all power lies with the political-bureaucratic lobby.
In fact, divergent lessons emerge from a study of incidents in which senior military officers confronted and defied civil authority.
On one hand, there is the example of then defence minister George Fernandes' decisive sacking of Indian Navy Chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat in 1998 for defying orders from the civil government.
On the other hand, there was then defence minister A K Antony's passive acceptance in 2012, when the serving Indian Army Chief, General V K Singh, dragged the government to court for refusing to extend his service period by revising his date of birth.
The course chosen by the government -- decisive action against Bhagwat and weak-kneed acceptance of V K Singh's defiance -- eventually stemmed from the leadership rather than from the rules.
For the half-century after Independence, civil-military relations were the subject of a desultory debate, but it never picked up momentum, partly because the army was so much larger and more influential than the navy and the air force.
Starting from the Kargil conflict in 1999, a number of expert committees, including the Kargil Review Committee in 1999, the Group of Ministers Report of 2001, the Task Force on National Security in 2012 (also known as the Naresh Chandra Committee) and the Shekatkar Committee in 2016 examined and made recommendations on the inter-se advantages of creating the post of a tri-service commander -- whether a five-star 'chief of defence staff' (CDS) or a four-star 'permanent chairman chiefs of staff committee' (PC-COSC).
The Naresh Chandra Committee recommended the latter; a decision which would keep the civilian (read bureaucratic) control in place.
However, it was only in 2019, after the National Democratic Alliance was re-elected to power, that Prime Minister Narendra D Modi announced his decision to appoint a CDS.
In his Independence Day speech, he said: 'India should not have a fragmented approach. Our entire military power will have to work in unison and move forward. All the three (services) should move simultaneously at the same pace... After formation of this post (CDS), all the three forces will get effective leadership at the top level.'
Four months later, the Union Cabinet formally approved the creation of a CDS -- a four-star general who would be the equivalent in rank, salary and perquisites to the three service chiefs.
The appointment of CDS came with two major changes. First, the CDS would head a new organisation called the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), which would function within the ministry of defence (MoD) and deal with significant matters relating to the army, navy and air force.
This would serve to address a longstanding grouse of the three services, which was that the military had no status within the government.
All issues relating to the military were dealt with by the MoD. Now the DMA, headed by the secretary-ranked CDS, would provide a voice to the services.
(In one stroke, the armed forces got formal authority as part of the government.)
The second major change that is to be brought in by the DMA is the replacement of the present 17 single-service commands with a smaller number of joint/theatre commands.
This would bring to bear the synergised efforts of all three services to achieve battlefield objectives.
Towards this, the DMA's stated mandate includes: 'Facilitation of restructuring of military commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands.'
A key element of operationalising joint/theatre commands is the reporting chain -- the crucial question of who will report to whom.
Will the theatre commanders report to the service chiefs, or to the CDS, or to the defence minister? Axiomatically, will the CDS have operation control of the theatres or not? If yes, will a separate secretary DMA be appointed? These questions must be addressed on priority.
Longstanding prejudices and biases cloud these issues. There are fears that if the theatre commanders report to the CDS, the latter might emerge as an overly empowered military commander who could be a threat to democracy.
Then, there are the 'small service fears' of the navy and air force, who fear being marginalised by the comparatively large army.
Almost five years later, the three services have still not fully understood that joint/theatre commands are not a discussion point; they are the prime minister's diktat on a military reform measure that is in line with what armed forces around the world have implemented.
The CDS must forward his proposals, as mandated, to the government at the soonest, including the all-important recommendations on higher defence management.
The outlines of the new structures are already visible: A 'Northern Theatre Command', headed by an army general to handle the China threat; a 'Western Theatre Command' headed by an air marshal to handle the Pakistan threat; a 'Maritime Theatre Command' headed by an admiral to defend peninsular India; and a 'Strategic Forces Command' to handle India's nuclear deterrent.
These serve to assuage most fears: The army's size would be significantly reduced by giving the navy control of the peninsula.
The air force would remain a coherent whole. And the army, still the biggest force, would continue to oversee the India-China border.
Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff.com
