Much drama is likely to continue in the coming year within the Sangh Parivar as well as involving the Opposition parties and, of course, the BJP's allies, predicts Modi biographer Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay.
While interviewing noted French academic Christophe Jaffrelot recently, I asked how he assessed the year that soon slips into history. His reply was that 2024, in Indian history, would be retrospectively looked at as the 'point of inflexion', or the year of shift in politics.
This was indeed a year of big changes globally, but we will restrict ourselves to Indian electoral terms. After a decade of single-party majority, the electorate did not deliver an emphatic verdict.
Instead, the Bharatiya Janata Party was reduced to a sub-majority tally, forcing Prime Minister Narendra D Modi to helm a truly 'coalition' government; not one which was not a political partnership merely in name, as those formed in 2014 and 2019.
Despite claims by Modi of securing a third mandate in succession, limitations of the BJP being rendered to a minority status were immediately evident: After opposition from political adversaries as well as allies, the PM rolled back the move to recruit 45 mid-level bureaucrats through 'lateral entry'.
He was also left with no choice but to refer the Waqf Bill to a Joint Parliamentary Committee of Parliament. The tenure of this committee has also been extended beyond the deadline for it to submit its report, a sign of the government's 'enforced reasonableness'.
The situation eased for the BJP and the PM during the Winter session of Parliament, evident in the effortlessness with which the government introduced the legislation on One Nation One Election.
But this was only after Modi changed tack and brought up Bills and key decisions for deliberation in the Union Cabinet and secure its clearance(s) consensually, before moving it in Parliament.
In contrast to what was witnessed in the weeks immediately after government formation in June, it is relatively not so much a one-man show any longer.
It would be naive to assume that after successive electoral victories in Haryana and Maharashtra (in that sequence), the BJP can revert to unilateral decision-making.
After all, the party campaign in the two states were noted for the conspicuously below 'normal' presence of Modi in whipping up votes for the party and its candidates.
In contrast to what was seen from 2014 onwards when decisions were taken without any consultation, coalition partners will seek time and deliberate if proposals will negatively impact their voter base.
For instance, the Janata Dal-United and the Telugu Desam Party are unlikely to back schemes or decisions that may draw the disapproval of religious minorities, especially Muslims, on changes in the waqf law.
Furthermore, they are certainly not going to be as enthusiastic as the BJP leadership is, in endorsing Modi's pitch on the Universal Civil Code and his 'no' to Muslim quotas.
These points were emphatically made by the PM during his reply to the debate on the Constitution in the Winter session.
Partners of the National Democratic Alliance may not have spoken up yet, because Modi just articulated his position and these are not yet 'decisions'. But they will surely speak up if these are formally brought up for parliamentary consideration.
The 2024 elections will go down in history as the one when the fault line within the Sangh Parivar became visible after two decades; it was last witnessed during the 2004 polls when the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government was voted out and a Congress-led government assumed office.
The split this time went beyond the divide of 2004. Unlike back then, this time the signs of the schism between the two were evident even though the campaign; formally launched by Modi with the inauguration of the Ram temple in Ayodhya on January 22.
That all not well between the BJP and the RSS (along with the top brass of the two) became evident within weeks of this high voltage event peppered with a massive dose of religio-cultural politics.
This indifference of the RSS to the elections, unfortunately for Modi and BJP, coincided with the declining interest in the Ram temple.
Quite clearly, the PM failed to foresee that declaring the temple open and opening its portals to the public, for the people, marked the closure of the four-decade long agitation which catapulted the BJP from the periphery to the epicentre of power.
To retain its popularity, the party had to rake up other issues or hype up existing narratives, which the BJP failed to do and thus the consequences.
Very conspicuously, the omnipresent RSS network of swayamsevaks was not visible in the drive to solicit votes for the BJP candidates by going from one door to another.
That this rift was not localised became self-evident when Modi personally began taking recourse to highly communally charged speeches, which has been his home base in successive elections from 2002 onwards, especially when he felt the campaign was floundering.
Awkwardness in the Modi-RSS relationship was nothing new and surfaced visibly after he became Gujarat chief minister in 2001.
He gave short shrift to the local RSS but its national-level leaders did not try to dislodge him because he delivered on ideological objectives.
Moreover, his role in the Gujarat 2002 riots enhanced his popularity and mobilised support for Hindutva.
Modi had temperamentally never been in the mould of the organisation's 'ideal' leader. He was egocentric, indulged in self-love including often speaking in the third person, and promoted his personality cult.
His consistent adherence to Hindutva-based politics, especially non-economic issues, balanced the negatives.
However, the highly personalised campaign in this year's election (Modi Ki Guarantee and Abki Baar 400 Paar -- 'Modi's Guarantee and This Time, Beyond 400) -- proved too much to stomach for the RSS and they decided not to campaign/
Disparagingly, RSS activists replied to queries on their inactivity, 'Well it's Modi's guarantee, so let him secure the numbers.'
Instead of reaching out to pacify the RSS, Modi upped the ante and his close aide, J P Nadda, party president, needlessly cocked a snook at the RSS and said that the party was now competent and could do without the Sangh Parivar. Few political statements could have been more self-damaging than this.
As a result, Modi failed in his quest to return with a brimming bag of Lok Sabha seats. Clearly delighted at the BJP's shortfall, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat continued with his diatribes.
A compromise of sorts began being worked out with Nadda attending the RSS coordination committee meeting at Palakkad, Kerala.
This was a clear sign that the BJP still 'needed the RSS' as against Nadda's claim in that interview with the Indian Express
Like always, he faithfully reported, at the meeting, the reasons behind the BJP's failure to secure a majority of its own.
The RSS returned to campaigning in Haryana with a reported caveat -- that Modi's campaign speeches be limited. But that was not enough for the Nagpur-based brass.
In another meeting in October, this time of their national executive, the RSS endorsed the status of Yogi Adityanath as an alternate pole within the BJP.
Its general secretary also publicly stated that the RSS had 'taken note' of Nadda's utterances and had 'dealt with it'. The message was clear.
In Maharashtra too, Devendra Fadnavis was backed by the RSS leadership.
Over the coming year, one can expect many more dramatic moments in the RSS-Modi narrative, including the former's role in selecting the next BJP president.
It is important to note that the RSS considers the sangathan or organisation of greater import than the vyakti or individual, which in this case is Modi.
Both the RSS and Modi talk of a future and working for a more hegemonic position. The RSS objective is to merge the Sangh into Samaj or society, when the majority begins subscribing to the Hindutva ideology.
Modi's goal is to transform India into Viksit Bharat and a leader among nations in the world. But while only a miracle will enable him to see and even remain active almost a quarter of a century later, the RSS as an organisation is more likely to sustain itself, especially after sustaining itself for a century.
The RSS objective is to minimise the role of the individual in establishing its organisational hegemony.
Time will tell if the BJP's victories in Maharashtra and Haryana marks the beginning where the RSS considers that it can secure electoral victories with just two instruments: The sangathan and vichar or vichardhara (idea or ideology).
Such a conclusion in the near future will diminish Modi's position, as he can, in the eyes of the RSS brass, be replaced with anyone else.
Much drama is likely to continue in the coming year, within the Sangh Parivar, as well as involving the Opposition parties and, of course, the allies of the BJP.
These developments may only make 2024 undeniably another inflexion-point in Indian history and politics, quite like 1977, 1989, 1992 and 2014.
Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay is an author and journalist based in Delhi-NCR.
His latest book is The Demolition, The Verdict and The Temple: The Definitive Book on the Ram Mandir Project.
He is also the author of Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times.
Feature Presentation: Rajesh Alva/Rediff.com
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