Not just the cricket match, it seemed that everything went the way of those ten men who came in the speedboat. That evening because of the high tide, seawater had come right up to the rocks, just 60-70 metres off the main road. Had it been low tide the water would have ended 150 to 200 metres away from the rocks, leaving in between a thick and slippery muddy stretch, one foot deep and difficult to manoeuvre. But the elements made everything a breeze and the strangers hauled their heavy bags off the boat and approached the road unhindered -- luck was on their side. Tandel observed, 'The way they anchored their boat, the loop of the rope was different from the one tied by us fishermen.' Unfortunately, despite the peculiarities Tandel and Tamore had spotted, they did not inform the police. Both went back to their houses and like the others sat down to enjoy the cricket match. Only after news of the terrorist attack broke out on TV, did Tandel inform a police van patrolling the area. Police Inspector P N Jagtap, Sub-Inspector Anil Kamble and Sub-Inspector Rajendra Kamble, all attached to the Cuffe Parade police station, reached the spot.
With the help of the fishermen the cops retrieved the speedboat from the water, which had got unhinged and was drifting more than 200 feet away from the shore, and a bomb disposal squad soon arrived and rummaged the boat in search of explosives. Though no explosives or arms or ammunition were recovered from the boat, an assortment of seemingly harmless articles, which would soon form crucial material evidence, was recovered from the boat: eight yellow life jackets manufactured in China, an off-white drum of twenty-five litres capacity containing approximately twelve litres of diesel, some tools in a polythene bag, a yellow coloured tube of adhesive manufactured in Pakistan for fixing punctures, two eight-foot-long rowing sticks with a one-and-a-half-foot-wide patta. The boat had a Yamaha engine, and had been painted yellow, the colour recently applied -- as investigation would later reveal -- to make the boat look old. There were three valves on either side of the boat which the cops unscrewed to deflate it and then hauled it to the Cuffe Parade police station on a handcart.
The news of the recovery of an abandoned speedboat soon spread like fire. 'The terrorists had come by sea. An abandoned speedboat has been found drifting in the waters near Badhwar Park at Cuffe Parade': the bold words flitted across TV screens. In a flash, Singh's -- still glued to the TV -- status changed: from a horrified, concerned spectator he became a central character in the bloody terror attack. Exactly six days ago, on 20 November, at around 4 pm, Singh's office, situated in a three-storey complex at Worli sea face in Mumbai, had received a fax: 'Intelligence indicates suspected LeT vessel sighted in position 24 DEG 16 MIN North and 67 DEG 2 MIN East attempting to infiltrate through sea route. Request: 1) Direct ship in area to exchange surveillance. Launch Dorniers at first light for sea-air coordinated search; 2) Deploy ACV IB to patrol off-creek area.' The fax was sent by principal director (operations), Coast Guard Headquarters, Delhi, who in turn had received this particular intelligence from the IB.
Singh had immediately called up Deputy Inspector General T K S Chandra, the commander of Coast Guard District Headquarters of Gujarat, whose office is at Porbandar, and instructed him to launch a hunt for a suspicious Pakistani vessel which could make a bid to enter the Indian waters. DIG Chandra in turn alerted the three Coast Guard substations under his jurisdiction -- Jakhau, Vadinar and Okha, all in Gujarat -- and told them to launch their vessels into the waters along the IMBL and search for the suspected 'LeT vessel'. One interceptor boat each from Jakhau and Vadinar, two hovercrafts and one fast patrol vessel from Okha immediately sailed towards the IMBL.
At the time, two joint military exercises -- Defence of Gujarat (DGX 8) and Tatraksha XXIV being carried out by the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, Border Security Force (BSF), the Indian Army and the respective ports between 18 and 22 November -- were underway in which a total of six vessels of the Coast Guard were participating. After receiving the IB input Singh pulled out all the six vessels that were intended for the military exercise and moved them towards the IMBL. All in all, one offshore patrol vessel with an integrated helicopter (a vessel with a sustenance of twelve to fourteen days in the outer sea without any external help), one inshore patrol craft (sustenance of four to five days), two fast patrol crafts, one air cushion vehicle (hovercraft), two interceptor boats and two Dorniers were asked to patrol the Indian waters from Diu and head to Porbandar to Okha to Kandla to Jakhau across the IMBL. (The Western region of the Indian Coast Guard has a total of fourteen ships, eight Dornier aircraft, six helicopters, two advance light helicopters, ten interceptor boats and two hovercrafts to patrol the 9,73,000 sq km of Indian waters across the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala and the Union territories of Daman and Diu and Lakshwadeep.)
Image: The rubber dingy the terrorists used to get ashore at Colaba.
Photograph: Vaihayasi Pande Daniel
Also see:
How fake currency funds terror
Video: Central Railway Chief PRO on the CST attack
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