Yes, by Dakotas of the Indian Air Force, but only 6 Dakotas could be spared by the IAF on the first day, they made 2 sorties each. Later these Dakotas were withdrawn because they were used to bring refugees from West Pakistan.

The air force had only 6 Dakotas and they could not be spared. Later we were told that all the civilian Dakotas in India could be made available to us from October 28 onwards. There were about 50 Dakotas in the country and they were placed at my disposal.

Our problem was that winter was fast approaching: by November 15 Srinagar airfield would not be usable. Srinagar only had a fair weather grass landing strip used by the maharaja. During the monsoon or with snow, it was put out of commission. We had to fly whatever we needed (before the winter) -- troops, stock for the winter, ammunition and this during the next 15 or 18 days.

Our other problem was that the land route through the Pir Panjal range and the Banihal pass (and there was no tunnel at that time), the pass is at about 10,000 feet and it would get blocked by the snows by November 15. (Therefore) whatever had to be sent to Kashmir, whether by air or road, had to be sent in these 15 or 20 days.

Time was the essence. It worked almost as a miracle. We flew 800 Dakota sorties in 15 days without a single mishap, even above the turbulent Pir Panjal range.

Mountbatten referred to this (operation) by saying: 'In my long experience of war, I have not come across a single instance of such a massive airlift executed at such short notice and so successful.'

This is the story of the airlift. Besides organising the airlift, I was staff officer at the HQ at the time when the British government decided that no British officer, serving either with the Indian or the Pakistan army, would be allowed to visit the theater of operation in Kashmir.

Being Indian, I was the only officer from the controlling headquarters who was going and coming to Srinagar whenever needed. I was thus intimately involved with the planning and conduct of the operations in Kashmir.

Som (Major Somnath Sharma) and I had served together in Burma, though we were posted in different sectors. When we returned from Burma to Delhi, Som used to come home quite often to see me. It is I who dispatched Som to Srinagar on October 29, with his hand in a plaster. The following day, I was again in Srinagar, I had to go almost everyday.

(That day) Som was most upset, he wanted to play a more active role. He felt that he was 'detained' to guard the airport.

I tried to explain to him the importance of the airfield and it so happened that 48 hours later, the airport was attacked. He was sent to Bagdam (to stop the raiders and the rest is history.