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Home > Money > Interviews > Enron Action group member Dr Om Damani
February 15, 2001
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Continued from previous page:

Information compiled by Enron Action group

Civil Suit No. 3392 0f 1995, filed by the State of Maharashtra Versus DPC and the MSEB, in the high court of judicature at Bombay. Ordinary civil jurisdiction.

12 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

GOM unconditionally and irrevocably:

a. agrees that the execution, delivery and performance by it of this Agreement and those agreements and other documents comprising the Security Package (as defined in the Power Purchase Agreement) to which it is a party constitute private and commercial acts rather than public or governmental acts;

b) agrees that, should any proceedings be brought against it or its assets in any jurisdiction in relation to this Agreement or any transaction contemplated by this Agreement, no immunity from such proceedings shall be claimed by or on behalf of itself or with respect to its assets;

c) Waives any right of immunity which it or any of its assets now has or may acquire in the future in any jurisdiction, and;

d) consents generally in respect of the enforcement of any judgment against it in any such proceedings in any jurisdiction in the giving of any relief or the issue of any process in connection with such proceedings including the making, enforcement or execution of any such judgment or any order arising out of any such judgment against or in respect of any property whatsoever irrespective of its use or intended use.’

9. On 15th Sept. 1994, a tripartite agreement was executed between the Government of India , Reserve Bank of India, and the then Government of Maharashtra and on the same day a counter Guarantee was signed by the Government of India but the same is not relevant for the purposes of this suit.

10. Meanwhile a Fuel Management Agreement (referred to in PPA) was negotiated and 1st Defendant also proposed amendments to the PPA and submitted draft for that purpose.

11. While the aforesaid was going on, as already mentioned above, on the expiry of the term of the State Legislative Assembly under Article 172 of the Constitution, elections were called for prior to such expiry by a press note dated 8.12.94 and a notification date 10.1.95; elections to the new Assembly to be constituted were held from 9-12 February, 1995, but announcement of results was deferred by the Election Commission in order to complete election process in other States which were to take place. It was this deferment of results which was taken advantage of and the letters/agreements of 2nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th February, 1995, 2nd and 4th March 1995 already mentioned above were got executed and/or exchanged. It was known at all material times to the 1st Defendant that one of the principal planks of the election manifesto of Shiv Sena - BJP alliance (which was then in main opposition and had been constantly on the floor of the Assembly clamoring for disclosure of terms of the agreement with the 1st Defendant which was being withheld) specifically provided (to the knowledge of the 1st Defendant) for "a review of the doubtful ENRON deal" if and when the said alliance came to power.

12. After the change of the Government on 14th March, 1995, a review was undertaken and as a result of the review, the Plaintiffs decided not to go ahead with the said Project. Consequently the Plaintiffs directed the 2nd Defendant to inform the 1st Defendant to stop work on the said Project. Accordingly letter dated 7th August, 1995 was addressed by the 2nd Defendant to the 1st Defendant with a copy thereof to the Plaintiffs, directing the 1st Defendant to stop work on the said Project. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibits ‘I’ is a copy of the said letter dated 7th August, 1995 ex.’1’

13. Since then the Plaintiffs have received two notices from the 1st Defendant as follows:

i) A Notice of arbitration dated 4th August, 1995 was issued by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiffs purporting to have been issued under the said State Support Agreement purporting to invoke Clause 11 viz. the arbitration clause of the said State Support Agreement, inter alia, claiming a sum in excess of US$ 300,000,000 for the alleged breach of the State support Agreement. Additionally, the claim also includes an alleged claim for loss of profit to be quantified in due course. The relief’s sought to be claimed are inter alia declaration that the said support Agreement is valid and binding, for a declaration that the Plaintiffs have allegedly committed a breach of the said Agreement, for damages for the alleged breach, for specific performance and for interim measures. By a Notice of Appointment of Arbitrator dated 9th August, 1995 the Plaintiffs appointed Mr. Andrew John Rogers as an Arbitrator. hereto annexed and marked Exhibit ‘J’ is a copy of the said Notice of Arbitration dated 4th August, 1995 and Exhibit ‘K’ is a copy of the said Notice dated 9th August, 1995.

ii) The 1st Defendant issued another Notice of Arbitration dated 14th August, 1995 purportedly invoking the arbitration clause 6(D) of the said Guarantee Agreement dated 10th February, 1994 inter alia claiming that the Plaintiffs were bound to indemnify the 1st Defendant against the alleged loss sustained. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit ‘L’ is a copy of the said notice dated 14th August, 1995 by the said Notice the said Mr. Andrew John Rogers was appointed as an Arbitrator.

14. On 9.8.1995 the 1st Defendant addressed a letter to the present Chief Minister of the Plaintiff which was responded to on 11.8.95 the Secretary, Energy, of the State Government. The Plaintiffs crave leave to refer to and rely upon the said letters dated 9.8.1995 and 11.8.1995 when produced.

15. In the circumstances, the Plaintiffs submit that as more particularly stated herein below, the documents mentioned in para 3 © herein (which as already mentioned were part of one entire transaction) - particularly PPA as well as other documents adjunct to PPA are in violation of statutory provisions including the ESA - were and are as such fraudulent in law and/or defeat the provision of law and are opposed to public policy. The said PPA and adjunct documents. viz. inter alia Government’s State Support Agreement and Guarantee are also illegal and void because there was active fraud and/or mis-representation on the part of the 1st Defendant ( and its principal share-holders). The conduct of the 1st Defendant has been vitiated by lack of bonafides is such as the Court would record as fraudulent in the circumstances of the case. The various acts and conduct which are deceptive and fraudulent and the grounds on which the contract is unlawful and void are also set out herein below.

A) i) The PPA has been executed in complete contravention of the requirements of Section 29 of the ESA. The 1st Defendant has been projected as a generating company under the ESA and is bound to fulfill all the terms and conditions and provision of the ESA. Section 29 provides that before such a contract for a generating company supplying power to the Board is entered into, the proposed scheme along with the salient features thereof has to be notified in the Gazette and published in the newspapers so as to invite objection from interested members of the public as well as licensees. Thereafter these objections along with the proposed scheme are to be sent to the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) for techno economic clearance. In the present case, the only notification or public advertisement under Section 29 was published on 21/22nd September 1993 by the 1st defendant. The only information that it contained was the total cost of the project (Rs. 9053 crores), total capacity (2015 MW) and that it would use LNG as primary fuel. The Notification did not contain other salient features thereof (such as the rate at which electricity would be purchased by the 2nd Defendant, the rate of interest on debt, the rate of return on equity, which were assumed in this etc. In fact, the Notification did not even mention that the project had been bifurcated into two Phases which could run independently of each other and further that Phase. 1 of the Project would use distillate rather than LNG as fuel. In fact the 1st Defendant acknowledged that it received 34 letters in response to this advertisement including inter alia from the Mumbai Grahak Panchayat and the Swadeshi Jagran Manch. These responses in particular pointed out the complete inadequacy of information about the Project contained in the Notification and sought further information about the terms on which the Plant would supply electricity to the 2nd Defendant. Instead of notifying the other salient features of this Project or even providing this information to the Mumbai Grahak Panchayat and the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch among others, the 1st Defendant proceeded to inform the CEA that though it had received letter in response to their notification, there have been no objections to the Project vide their letter dated 21.11.93, None of the queries of the representationists were responded to by the 1st Defendant and in some cases even the exact text of the notification was not provided. In fact the 1st Defendant did not even forward these letters to the CEA in their communication to them dated 21/11/1993. In their response dated 26/11/1993 the CEA informed the 1st Defendant that it had already on 12.11.1993 granted techno-economic clearance to the Project i.e., before even the expiry of two months from the data of Notification and before even 1st Defendant had informed the CEA about the response to the Notification. Apart from this, the Project Report submitted to the CEA on the basis of which this clearance has been granted is dated April 1993 which was not the project which has been finally approved. It may be pointed out that the capital cost mentioned in this Project Report for Phase - I and Phase - II is 2459 Million Dollars (without duties) and 2711 Million Dollars (with duties) which is several hundred million Dollars less than the final cost which was given by 1st Defendant for the PA. The CEA therefore was not even given the final draft of the PPA which had been prepared in September/November 1993. it was asked and it did give its clearance on the basis of an earlier project report of April 1993 where the proposed project differ substantially form the final projects. One other major different being that the final project is a decoupled project consisting of Phase-land Phase-II. The Project submitted to the CEA was a coupled project of Phase-I and Phase-II. Thus, the whole object of Section 29 has been completely defeated by making the CEA give clearance to a project which was not the proposed project which has been agreed upon, by making them give approval without notifying the project to the public and without even waiting for the objections to even the few things that were notified. The entering into of the PPA was itself contrary to Law since the statutory requirements of Section 29 of ESA were not complied with.

ii) The PPA violates Section 43A of the ESA read with the statutory notification dated 30.3.1992 issued under the Section giving the tariff guidelines-in force on December 8, 1993. In particular, the tariff guidelines permitted only a return of 16% on equity but the PPA allows a return much in excess of 25%. Secondly, the tariff notification puts a cap on Operation and Maintenance (O &M) charges at 2.5% of the capital cost. In the case of the PPA the O & M changes were over Rs. 90 crores annually which is over 3% of the capital cost. The PPA was not even structured in accordance with the said notification. The entering into of the PPA was thus on this ground also contrary to law and violative of Section 23 of the Contract Act.

iii) The tariff notification allows payments only for actual fuel consumed and not for deemed consumption. In the present case the 1st Defendant has allowed fuel charges or energy payments on the basis of deemed consumption which is bound to be greater than their actual consumption since the heat rate guaranteed by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant is 7605 BTU per unit while the heat rate guaranteed by GEC to the 1st Defendant is considerably lower. Under the PPA about 25% of this difference and deemed consumption and actual consumption is allowed to be retained by 1st Defendant contrary to the tariff notification.

iv) The tariff notification obliges the tariff to be fixed for 5 years in advance in the present case. Even though the PPA is valid for 20 years, the actual tariff is completely variable and dependent upon such variables like rate of inflation in India and the USA, the Exchange Rate variations between Dollar and Rupee and market prices of fuel prevalent from time to time.

v) Under Section 16 of the ESA, the State Government is required to constitute a body known as the State Electricity Consultative Council for the state (SECCS) which advises the Boards (including MSEB) and the generating companies (including 1st Defendant) on "major questions of policies and major schemes" and to consider such other matters as the board or generating company may place before it. Since 1986 SECCS had not been constituted and on a Civil Writ Petition filed in the Bombay High Court (CWP no. 707/93) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on 7.6.1993 directed the State Government to constitute the said SECCS as contemplated by Section 16 of the Electricity Supply Act within 6 months from 7.6.1993 i.e. on or before 7.12.19093. No. such Council was constituted by the State Government till 8.12.1993 It was on 19.2.1994 that the State Government constituted SECCS by which time PPA was a fait accompli (signed on 8.12.1993). Section 16 was and is intended to be statutory safeguard particularly since council is to be a representative body representing the wide range of interest. At all material times, 1st Defendant knew or ought to have known that a statutory safeguard had been provided for in Section 16 and the Scheme of the 1st Defendant normally would have gone to the SECCS . The Scheme has therefore been executed in violation of the letter and spirit of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948.

vi) The PPA violates the legislative policy of the ESA as laid down by Section 18 of the ESA, which provides that the Board will arrange "in co-ordination with generating companies in the State for the most efficient and economical supply and distribution of electricity. This PPA obliges 2nd Defendant to runt the 1st Defendant Plant as a Base Load Plant (running at full capacity day and night) and thus shut down other considerably cheaper plants whose variable cost also is considerably lower than of 1st Defendant during off-peak hours when the supply of this volume of the electricity is not required.

vii) The PPA also violates Section 30 of the ESA in as much as the CEA has an obligation to clear only those proposals which are techno-economically viable and most feasible. In the present case, the capital cost as well as cost of supply of electricity of this Plant was much higher than that of other recently commissioned power plants and even that which could be obtained from alternative sources.

B) The PPA has been procured by fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant has made the following misrepresentation or concealed the following relevant information from the 2nd Defendant which ought to have been disclosed.

i) The 1st Defendant misrepresented about the cost of their other power stations in other parts of the world such as the Teeside plant in U.K. which was completed by the 1st Defendant in 1993. That the 1st Defendant gave false/misleading information about the capital costs of their own other power plant set up in other parts of the World in order to justify the capital cost of the 1st Defendant’s plant. In their Annual Report of 1992, the principal shareholder of 1st Defendant has given the cost of the Teeside plant as 1.2 Billion $ for 1875 MW i.e., below $ 650 Per KW. Thereafter in July, 1993, the 1st Defendant however represented to the Plaintiffs that the capital cost of the Teeside Plant was $ 1009 per KW. further the 1st Defendant also gave false/misleading figures, about the break up of the estimated capital cost of the 1st Defendant’s plant at Dabhol. This is clear from the series of changing figures that 1st Defendant’s gave from time to time between July 1992 and December 1993 about the cost components for this plant. In fact, the figures given by the 1st Defendant to the Central Electricity Authority in their Project Report dated April 1993 which was used as the basis for securing Techno-Economic Clearance for the Project are also substantially different from the final figures on the basis of which the capacity charges were built into PPA. This is also clear from the fact that 1st Defendant in its Annual Report of 1992 uses an expert study to justify the economic viability of Gas based power plants. This study also mentions the capital costs of gas based plants to be $ 683 per/KW, much less than the cost claimed for the Dabhol plant which is $ 1200 per KW. The fact that the 1st Defendant gave highly inflated cost figures for the Dabhol plant is also clear from its own claim in its Annual Report of 1993 where it says, "using U.S. costs and other cost comparisons as a base a new natural gas power plant costs from one half to two thirds less to build than a coal or nuclear Plant. "It may be noted that even the current capital costs of a Coal based Plant are considerably less than the figure of 4.2 crores per MW furnished by the 1st Defendant for Phase I and Rs. 4.5 crores Per MAW,. for Phase I and II of the Dabhol plant which is gas based plant.

ii) The 1st Defendant misrepresented to 2nd Defendant about the rate of interest which they were likely to pay on foreign loans, which have been assumed as the basis for arriving at the capacity charges and rates of return. This is clear from the fact that the interest rates assumed for debt servicing of the loans, both Indian and foreign, in the build up of the capacity charge of the PPA are considerably higher than the commercial rate of interest prevailing at that time as well as the rate actually paid by the 1st Defendant for loans for this project. The interest rate represented by the 1st Defendant on their foreign debt in justifying their return on equity is 10/ 9.5%. This was greatly in excess of the interest which the 1st Defendant knew would be charged on Foreign Debt which is actually much less than 10%. In fact the Annual Report of 1st Defendant of 1992 and 1993 mentions that the interest rates on short term borrowing had come down to 3.9% in the year 1992 and even lower in the year 1993.

iii) The 1st Defendant concealed from the 2nd Defendant the vital information that its arrangement/contract with Bechtel, its turn-key contractor, provide for huge penalties for delay in construction of the plant as well as for shortfall in plant capacity. Thus, which the 1st Defendant were justifying to the 2nd Defendant the high rate of return on the basis of the guarantee to the 2nd Defendant for the date of completion of the Project and plant capacity, it concealed the fact that 1st Defendant contract with its turn-key contractor gave the 1st Defendant several times higher penalties than the penalties payable by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant for any delay in construction or shortfall in the capacity. it may be noted that the total contract cost of the 1st Defendant with Bectell which is included in the Project cost takes into account these guarantees/penalties. It may be pointed out that the net effect of the guarantees/ penalties between the 1st Defendant/ the 2nd Defendant and the 1st Defendant/Bectell is that the 1st Defendant instead of being penalized for delay in construction or for performance shortfall will actually get a huge premium for it.

iv) The 1st Defendant misrepresented to 2nd Defendant about the preclosing clearances that had been complied with by the 1st Defendant by 25th February 1995 and further fraudulently induced the 2nd Defendant to agree to waiver of all these conditions by stating in the letter of 25th February 1995 that mere signing of that letter in respect of the same would constitute waiver of the clearances set out in that letter. In particular, it may be pointed out that even though several preclosing clearances such as clause 2 (I) (I) of the pre-closing clearance of Schedule II of the PPA (a direct loan agreement between 2nd Defendant and the lenders) had not been fulfilled, the 1st Defendant fraudulently told the 2nd Defendant that this condition had been complied with by means of consent letter of 2nd Defendant dated 2/2/1995. This consent letter clearly does not amount to a compliance with the pre-closing clearance specified in clause 2(I) (I) of the PPA. It may be pointed out that this direct loan agreement between the 2nd Defendant and the lender was necessary on account of some clauses in the PPA. which allowed for certain circumstances in which the contract would be terminated in which case the 2nd Defendant was to take over the obligations of the 1st Defendant to the lenders. That is why a direct loan agreement was necessary between the 2nd Defendant and the lenders so that it was clear that the lenders were agreeable for this contingencies in the PPA. What had instead been executed on 2/2/1995 is merely in the nature of a trusteeship deed executed between the 2nd Defendant, Bank of America and the IDBI. There is no direct loan agreement between the 2nd Defendant and the lenders as envisaged in clause 2(1) (a). Thus the 1st Defendant purported to make the PPA binding upon 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff in this fraudulent manner.

C) The PPA is contrary to the public policy of this country in as much as it will cause a huge loss to the public exchequer on the purchase and sale of power of place an unconscionable burden on the electricity consumers of the State. This is clear from the fact that the estimated costs of Dabhol power at the bus-bar (factory gate) of the plant is currently estimated by 1st Defendant to be Rs. 2.4 per KWH. This estimate is based on current exchange rate of $ against Rupee, current, cost of distillate which constitutes almost 50% of the total cost of DPC power. Apart from this there are several peculiar features of this PPA which will have a critical impact on the current as well as future cost of DPC power to the consumer and on the public ex-chequer. These are the following:

i) The capacity charge in this PPA is back loaded by 4% and in addition denominated almost entirely in $. This means that irrespective of anything, capacity charge would increase in $ terms by 4% per year and its impact on the State Electricity Board would be further aggravated by the appreciation of the $ against the Rupee which has historically for last 15 years been at an average annual rate of 8%. Thus the estimated capacity charge in Rupee terms which are above 50% of the total cost under these conditions would increase by about 12% per year over the 20 years term of the contract.

ii) The fuel for the plant consists of entirely imported distillate/LNG, the supply or the price of which is entirely beyond the control of the 2nd Defendant or any other State agencies . The supply and price however is largely under the control of the 1st Defendant and its holding company ENRON whose affiliate has been appointed fuel manger. The price for fuel would have to be paid for in $, which means that its price would escalate with the appreciation of the $ against the Rupee, the supplies would be on long term fuel supply contracts entered into by the 1st Defendant since there are hardly any spot markets for LNG fuel. Moreover, the risk of interruption or disruption of fuel supply is entirely borne by the 2nd Defendant under the contract in the force major and other clauses.

iii) The PPA is structured in a manner such that 1st Defendant‘s plant can only be operated as a base load unit with the 2nd Defendant being obliged to off-takes at least 90% of the capacity of the plant at all times. This is because the capacity payments are charged on plant availability and not on off-takes. Thus irrespective of the off-take, capacity payment would have to be made for almost full capacity of plant. Although the 2nd Defendant can ask the 1st Defendant to back down one of the two main units, the other clauses of the contract render this completely impracticable on account of.

(a) cold and hot start fee which are quite high; and

(b) `take or pay’ clause regarding fuel under the contract which essentially obliges the 2nd Defendant to pay for the entire fuel which would have been consumed if the plant had been running at full capacity.

All this taken together would imply that under the PPA, the 2nd Defendant are obliged to purchase the electricity at almost full capacity of this plant. This means that during off-peak hours when the demand on the grid is less than even the present availability and even future estimated availability from other cheaper plants, the 2nd Defendant would be required to purchase power from the 1st Defendant, at a variable cost which is approximately 2 to 3 times the variable costs of other 2nd Defendant’s plants. These plants will be required to backed down in order to accommodate the supply from 1st Defendants plant in order to meet its coercive obligation to the 1st Defendant. This factor alone would add very significantly to the average cost of the 1st Defendant’s supply of power to the 2nd Defendant.

(iv) More than 95% of the payment to the 1st Defendant for electricity purchased by the 2nd Defendant under this contract will be in $ terms. Thus the presently estimated annual foreign exchange out-go for Phase I would be approximately 400 million $ and in excess of 1.2 billion $ for both Phases. This will go up every year. In fact, even the approval of the Government of India for this Project was only for a foreign exchange out-go of 950 million $ per year for both the Phases together and this was the figure given by the 1st Defendant to the Central Electricity Authority in its Project report on the basis of which the CEA has granted approval. However, the actual estimated forex outflow known to the 1st Defendant at the time of the approval of the CEA was in excess of 1.2 billion $ which was to go up year by year. These facts were concealed by 1st Defendant from the various authorities in seeking and getting approvals.

(v) that the PPA has various force majeure clauses and clauses relating to change in tax/change in law which not only insulate the 1st Defendant against changes in tax/law in future but also insulate the 1st Defendant’s profits against any unforeseen contingencies such as fire, earth-quake, strikes, lock-out, etc. which may affect the working of the plant. The adverse financial impact of all these above unforeseen events under the PPA are to be borne by the 2nd Defendant. Further the 2nd Defendant will be obliged to ensure that the 1st Defendant gets its profits and costs, on account of any change in law, change in tax. The cost of these contingencies which will be directly passed on to the 2nd Defendant should also be factored into cost of the 1st Defendant supply power.

(f) In order to arrive at the consumer cost of DPC power one has to further include the cost and interest of putting up the main transmission line from the 1st Defendant’s plant to the Grid, cost of augmenting the grid i.e. Transmission and Distribution (T & D) cost and the transmission and distribution line. The cost of mainlines to evacuate DPC power which is to be borne by the 2nd Defendant is estimated at over Rs. 300 crores. The impact of T&D loss and cost would be in addition.

(g) If all the above factors are included in the cost of the 1st Defendant’s power and a levelised cost is worked out for the 20 years operation of the contract, it will be found that the levelised cost of DPC power to the consumer is greatly in excess of the price of Rs. 2.40/kwh being quoted by the 1st Defendant. This cost would be more than twice the average current rate of the 2nd Defendant’s supply of power from various other power plants supplying power to the 2nd Defendant. In addition this will require a foreign exchange out-flow of almost Rs. 4000 crores annually (for phase I and II together) which would go on increasing with years on account of back-loading of capacity charges will increase by 4% per year in $ terms and on account of $ denomination of the charges which will also increase with the likely appreciation of $ against Rupee.

Another method of establishing the high cost of DPC power would be to examine the justification of 1st Defendant from time to time about their costs and returns.

I) The 1st Defendant assumes a total cost of 910 million $ for Phase I and about 2.82 billion $ for Phase I & II. Out of this, the debt equity ratio is 70:30 and about 85% of the debt is foreign debt. The rate of interest assumed on the foreign debt is approximately 10% and the Indian rate of interest on Indian debt is on actual interest rate. The internal rate of return of equity in $ terms was estimated by 1st Defendant (in justifying their tariff) to be approximately 26%. The average rate of return by 1st Defendant’s own calculations is in excess of 40%. In the first place the capital cost has been inflated as is clear from the arbitrarily varying figures of capital cost furnished by ENRON from time to time, the comparison with the capital cost of other power plants being set up in India, as well as the estimated cost of power plants calculated by various expert organizations such as Electric Power Research Institute, USA etc. It can safely be demonstrated that the capital cost given by ENRON to justify the tariff is at least 20% higher than the actual capital cost which they were likely to incur.

Apart from this, one major element in the capital cost is the cost of the Harbour. The PPA allows 1st Defendant to use the harbour for other customers in the country. This will also inflate their returns. Therefore, there is no justification for the entire cost of the harbour to be included in this Project cost.

ii) The interest rate assumed on a foreign debt which is the bulk of the debt for this Project is approximately 10%. In actual fact the weighted average rate of interest payable by ENRON for their loans for this Project is considerably less than 8%. This factor alone will increase the 1st Defendant’s internal rate of return considerably

iii) Apart from this there are various other costs which have been used to justify the capacity and energy charges in the PPA which are likely to be quite different from the actual cost incurred by the 1st Defendant. Thus the 1st Defendant are likely to get various other benefits such as availability bonus, higher efficiency of the plant, etc. All this will further increase the IRR substantially.

iv) It may also be pointed out that the capacity charge which is supposed to largely consist of debt servicing charges and return on equity is to go on increasing at 4% ($ terms) throughout the 20 years of the PPA even though the debt of the 1st Defendant would be fully paid up at the rate of capital repayment assumed within 12 years.

h) That this PPA is also contrary to public policy in as much as the Project is dependent upon imported fuel especially LNG, the supply of which is completely beyond the control of the 2nd Defendant or any State Agency. In fact, the supply of LNG is highly uncertain. Apart from this the owners of the 1st Defendant viz., ENRON is one of the main gas suppliers in the world and by such a contract as envisaged in the PPA, the 2nd Defendant would become totally dependent upon the 1st Defendant for the supply of fuel to the extent that they could easily manipulate its price That the principal shareholders of 1st Defendant were hoping to make huge profits on the supply of LNG for this plant is clear from their statement in their Annual Report of 1992 that "Enron’s Power strategy is to secure profitability through a making of secure long term fuel supply contacts with long term power sales agreements. The strategy results in a predictable growing earning stream. "Such an uncertain and risky arrangement for fuel supply, especially where the price could be manipulated by the 1st Defendant and where the risks of disruption in supply are entirely borne by the 2nd Defendant is also contrary to public policy.

I) That this Contract read with other subsidiary contracts and guarantees insulates the 1st Defendant’s profits from every contingency such as, change in law, change in tax, even income-tax as well as such contingencies like fire, earthquake, strikes, lockouts, which would in any way affect the functioning of the 1st Defendant’s Plant. For a state agency to assume the consequences of such normal business risks is of a private company is also contrary to public policy.

D) It is submitted that the manner in which the arbitration clause in the PPA was originally agreed to and subsequently amended also shows that the entire intention of the 1st Defendant was to get maximum advantage to itself and cause maximum harm to the 2nd Defendant, the Plaintiffs and public interest. For instance, in PPA initially the arbitration clause was to be governed by the Indian Law. Suddenly after 8th December 1994, the process of amendment of PPA inter alia of its arbitration, was expedited to make English Law applicable to the Arbitration in the PPA. Similarly, the clause in the State Support Agreement regarding Governing Law was strangely agreed to in such manner as to make English Law applicable not only to the arbitration but also to the construction of the Agreement. The Plaintiffs submit that both the parties to the said State Support Agreement are Indian parties, one of them being the State of Maharashtra and there is no cause whatsoever for the State of Maharashtra to agree to the application of English Law, particularly when, if at all any cause of action were to arise, such cause of action would arise entirely in India under the said Agreement. Under the said State Support Agreement, the State of Maharashtra has given up its sovereign powers which it has no authority to do and clearly the Agreement is unconstitutional and contrary to public policy. It is submitted that the provision under the State Support Agreement to be governed by English Law is not based on any valid or bonafide ground. In fact, opting for the application of English Law by Indian parties in respect of an Indian cause of action is clearly illegal and unconstitutional. Such a clause, without prejudice to the aforesaid, is in any event not enforceable. Providing for English Law would result in excluding the Government of Maharashtra, if at all such a clause is valid, from exercising its constitutional and statutory rights and would be clearly in contravention of public policy. The manner in which different governing laws and different arbitration clauses have been included in different agreements and amended from time to time, clearly shows that the whole object was to gain maximum advantage to the 1st Defendant and to deny the legitimate rights of the Plaintiffs. There is no nexus or connection with English Law and consequently there is no reason to stipulate the application of English Law particularly when both parties are Indian and more particularly so as one of the parties is an Indian State. Even under the doctrine of choice of law as a rule of Private International Law, it is not permissible for Indian parties to contract to stipulate in effect that a totally unrelated contract or a totally unrelated cause of action with a foreign law would still be governed by a foreign system of law even though that foreign system of law would have no action whatsoever with the cause of action of the parties.

E) It has now come out that the whole object of the 1st Defendant was to gain maximum advantage to itself by the said Project at the cost of the Indian public. It was inter alia decided by the said ENRON to divest 20% to 30% equity holding in 1st Defendant to one New Orleans based Company called Energy Court at a high premium straightway which would result in the said ENRON making a substantial profit. It further appears that not only was the said ENRON gaining by entering into the Fuel Management Agreement but the said ENRON had nearly 40% equity or had negotiated to buy 40% stake in the LNG Plant in Qatar which would ultimately supply the said LNG to the 1st Defendant, Thus indirectly also the said ENRON was intending to make huge profits. It is in these circumstances that the said ENRON is making desperate attempts some how to cling to the said contract and is resorting to all sorts of illegal steps including causing threats to be delivered to the Plaintiffs.

f) Thus the manner in which the transaction was entered into, the contents of the said transactions the manner in which it was closed and the manner in which now the said ENRON and the 1st Defendant are acting to see that some how it is executed clearly show that the transaction is void, illegal, inoperative, incapable of performance, unlawful, contrary to law, public policy and public interest.

G) The Plaintiffs submit that in large multinational contracts, there is usually competitive bidding and in the absence of competitive bidding where a contract is entered into by negotiations, there must be complete transparency in the transaction and if the record reveals that either the act of entering into the contract or its implementation had corrupt consideration, the contract must be struck down a contrary to public policy, that the entire transaction was conceived malafide is made clear inter alia from the fact that the said ENRON admitted before the US sub-committee on Foreign Operations that they had spent a huge sum of US$ 20 Million "on the education and project development process alone not including the project cost". thus what is euphemistically described as education expense is unexplained expenditure spent to some how obtain the said contract. the subsequent and attempted explanation given by the 1st Defendant is at complete variance with their statement made by Linda Power-Vice President, Global Finance for Enron Development Corporation. It is clear that while the statement made by Linda Power-Vice President, Global Finance for Enron Development Corporation. It is clear that while the statement was given by ENRON, the explanation is now sought to be given by the 1st Defendant and consequently ENRON has exposed itself to investigation under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

H) The Government of Maharashtra under the PPA was only required to guarantee due and proper performance of all payment, obligations of the 2nd Defendant under PPA. But the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee as per draft of the 1st Defendant which they go executed, contains specific indemnity providing that the Guarantor (State Govt. of Maharashtra) undertakes as primary obligor to indemnify and keep indemnified the 1st Defendant against any loss sustained or incurred by it for reason, inter-alia, of illegality of the Guarantee or even illegality of PPA. Thus, the 1st Defendant envisaged a distinct possibility of PPA being held illegal for corrupt, or fraudulent motives or having been obtained by misrepresentation on the part of 1st Defendant. This is itself indicative of important public policy consideration raised in this suit. Such an indemnity clause is clearly contrary to public policy.

16.(a) It is submitted that in the circumstances aforesaid, and in view of what is stated herein, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 (Exhibit ‘C’ hereto), and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994 (Exhibit ‘D’ hereto), along with the PPA dated 8.12.1993 (Exhibit ‘B’ hereto), are void, illegal and contrary to public policy and are not capable of being enforced either in arbitration or otherwise and the Plaintiffs are entitled to the declarations prayed for in that behalf herein and the reliefs of perpetual and/or permanent injunctions as stated herein.

b) The Plaintiff submit that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to declare that the transactions covered by the aforesaid documents are invalid and void, inter alia, on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the 1st Defendant. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a further declaration that in any event the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 (Exhibit ‘C’ hereto) and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994 (Exhibit ‘d’ hereto) are per se violative of the provisions of the Constitution and/or law and/or are contrary to public policy and are as such, void.

c) The Plaintiffs submit that without prejudice to the aforesaid, they are entitled to a declaration that there was no waiver of Conditions Precedent as stipulated, inter alia, in clause 2 of the PPA as purported to be stated by the 1st Defendant in the letter dated 25.2.1995 (Exhibit ‘F’ hereto) of the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant and that in any even such purported waiver was not bonafide and was fraudulent and of no effect,. Assuming whilst denying that the purported waiver of the Conditions Precedent was valid and effective, the Plaintiffs submit that in any case other Conditions Precedent have not been waived and were not capable of being unilaterally waived.

d) The Plaintiffs submit that they are also entitled to a declaration that it was impermissible for the parties to the aforesaid transaction to enter into any arrangements or agreements after 8.12.1994 and/or 10.1.1995 and/or any date after 9/12.2.1995 by which time, the entire transaction, including the Power Purchase Agreement dated 8.12.1993, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 and the State Support agreement dated 24.6.1994 were terminable at will without legal and financial consequences.

e) The Plaintiffs submit that in any event it is impermissible in law for Indian parties to apply or agree to application of foreign law where a contract or the fulfillment of a contract has no relation whatsoever with the foreign law or law of foreign countries. It is quite clear that the provisions in the State Support Agreement and in the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee that rights and obligations of the parties under the Guarantee and the State Support agreement will be governed and construed by the English law are contrary to Indian law and violative of public policy. It is impermissible for Indian parties to apply the law other than Indian law where neither the contract nor its performance are referable to a place other than India. The Plaintiffs further submit that the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act read with Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ,all arbitration between Indian parties in respect of contracts entered into in India and to be performed in India must be governed by law of arbitration in India and not under any alleged specified system of international law or systems of arbitration rule which are not law in force in India. Even the purported amendment of the arbitration clause by amendment of PPA on 2.2.1995 providing that an arbitration agreement would be governed by the place of arbitration stipulated as London is also contrary to law. The Plaintiffs submit that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare that it was impermissible for the parties to the Power Purchase Agreement, as amended, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994 to stipulate that the governing law of contract (in the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee and the State Support Agreement) and the governing law of arbitration in all the three Agreements would be English law and in any event, the relevant clauses of the aforesaid three Agreements, stipulating the application of the English law either to the contract and/or to arbitration are null void and of no legal effect.

(f) The Plaintiffs submit that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare that the contractual provision with respect to arbitration contained in the amended PPA, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee and the State Support Agreement are contrary to Section 28 of the Contract Act and the Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and are null, void, illegal, inoperative and incapable of being performed and are null, void, illegal, inoperative and incapable of being performed.

17. In the circumstances aforesaid, the Plaintiffs submit that the Plaintiffs are entitled to orders of permanent and perpetual injunctions as prayed for herein:

a) The Plaintiffs submit that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order of permanent and perpetual injunction, restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner acting upon or in pursuance of the transactions contained in the Power Purchase Agreement dated 8.12.1993, as amended, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994, Exhibits ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ respectively.

b) The Plaintiffs submit that without prejudice to the aforesaid and in any event, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order and permanent injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner acting upon or in furtherance of or in pursuance of the purported letters/notices dated 4th August, 1995, 9th August, 1995 and 14th August, 1995, being Exhibits ‘J’. ‘K’ and L’ hereto.

c) In any event and without prejudice to the aforesaid, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue and order and permanent injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from proceeding on the footing that there was a valid waiver of Conditions Precedent by the letter dated 25.2.1995 of the 1st Defendant being Exhibit ‘F’ hereto.

d) In any event and without prejudice to the aforesaid, this Hon’ble Court maybe pleased to issue an order and permanent injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from proceeding on the footing that all the unfulfilled Conditions Precedent contained in clause 2 of the PPA have been waived.

18. The Plaintiffs submit that the Plaintiffs have filed the present suit in respect of only some of the reliefs out of several reliefs to which the Petitioners are entitled to arising out of the documents set out in the Plaint. Further, the Petitioners intend to file the present suit for some reliefs in respect of only certain documents forming a part of the said transaction of Power Project as compendiously evidenced by several documents. The Plaintiffs have filed the present suit for setting aside and/or declaration as void of only certain letters/documents. The Plaintiffs crave leave of this Hon’ble court under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to omit to sue in respect of other reliefs arising out f the same transaction and to omit to sue in respect of documents other than the documents set out in the Plaint and forming part of the same transaction.

19. The Plaintiffs submit that the entire cause of action in the suit has arisen in Bombay. The Agreements have been entered into in Bombay. The various letters and/or documents in respect of which reliefs are claimed herein, have been received by the Plaintiffs and/or the 2nd Defendant in Bombay. The 1st and the 2nd Defendant have their registered offices at Bombay and carry on business in Bombay. In the circumstances, this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.

20. The claim in the suit far exceeds Rs. 15 lakhs and for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction the Plaintiffs have paid the maximum court fees of Rs. 15,00/- The amounts of contracts, agreements, guarantee and clams made by the 1st Defendant and challenged herein are far in excess of Rs. 15 lakhs and the Plaintiffs have paid the maximum Court Fees of Rs. 15,00/-

21. The Plaintiffs will rely upon documents a list whereof is hereto annexed.

22. Mr. Nazir Nizaamuddin Patel, who is the Deputy secretary of the Department of Energy of the Plaintiffs is aware of the facts of the case from the documents thereof and who is competent to depose to the contents of the Plaint has signed and declared the Plaint.

The Plaintiffs, therefore, pray:

a) That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare that the transactions covered by the aforesaid documents namely the Power Purchase Agreement dated 8.12.1993 (being Exhibit ‘B’ hereto), the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 (being Exhibit ‘C’ hereto) and the State Support Agreement (being Exhibit ‘D’ hereto) as well as the said documents are invalid and void, inter alia, on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the 1st ‘Defendant and violations of public policy:

b) That in any even this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee, dated 10.2.1994 (Exhibit ‘C’ hereto) and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994(Exhibit ‘D’ hereto) are per se violative of the provisions of the Constitution and/or law and/or are contrary to public policy and are as such void;

c) Without prejudice to the aforesaid and in any event this Hon’ble court may be pleased to declare there was no waiver of Conditions Precedent as stipulated, inter alia, in clause 2 of the PPA as purported to be stated by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant and that in any event such purported waiver was not bonafide and was fraudulent and of no effect;

d) That without prejudice to the aforesaid and in any even this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare that other Conditions Precedent have not been waived and were not capable of being unilaterally waived:

e) That this Hon’ble court may be pleased to declare that it was impermissible for the parties to the aforesaid transaction to enter into any arrangements or agreements after 8.12.1994 and/or into any arrangements or agreements after 8.12.1994 and/or 10.1.1995 and/or any date after 9/12.2.95 by which time, the entire transaction, including the Power Purchase Agreement dated 8.12.1993, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994 were terminable at will without legal and financial consequences:

f) That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare that it was impermissible for the parties to the Power Purchase Agreement, as amended, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994 to stipulate that the governing law of contract (in the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee and the State Support Agreements) and the governing law of arbitration in all the three Agreements would be English law any in any event, the relevant clauses of the aforesaid three Agreements, stipulating the application of English law, either to the contract and/or arbitration, are null, void and of no legal effect.

g) That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare that the contractual provision with respect to arbitration contained in the amended PPA, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee, the State Support Agreement are contrary to Section 28 of the Contract Act and Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and tare null, void, illegal, inoperative and incapable of being performed;

h) That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order of permanent and perpetual injunction, restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner acting upon or in pursuance of the transactions contained in the Power Purchase Agreement dated 8.12.1993, as amended, the Government of Maharashtra Guarantee dated 10.2.1994 and the State Support Agreement dated 24.6.1994.

I) The Plaintiffs submit that without prejudice to the aforesaid ad in any event, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order and permanent injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner acting upon or in furtherance of or in pursuance of the purported laws/notices dated 4th August, 1995, August, 1995 and 14th August, 1995 Exhibits ‘J’, ‘K’ and ‘L’ respectively.

j) In any event and without prejudice to the aforesaid, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order of permanent injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from proceeding on the footing that there was a valid waiver of Conditions Precedent by the letter dated 25.2.1995 of the 1st Defendant being Exhibit ‘F’ hereto;

k) For costs of the suit;

l) For such other and further reliefs as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.

Plaint drawn by: Prashant Bhushan, Nitin Pradhan -- advocates; and settled by C J Sawant, Advocate-General; and re-settled by F S Nariman, senior advocate. For M/s. Desai Diwanji.

-- For the State of Maharashtra

Partner
Advocates for the Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
I, Nazir Nizaamuddin Patel, of Bombay Indian Inhabitant, Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy of plaintiffs having his office at Mantralaya, Bombay - 400 032 do hereby solemnly declare and state that what is stated in paragraphs, 1,2,12 to 14 and 22 of the foregoing Plaint is true to my own knowledge and what is stated in the remaining paragraphs 3 to 11 and 15 to 21 of the foregoing Plaint is stated on the basis of information and belief and I believe the same to be true.

Solemnly declared at Bombay this day of September, 1995.
Before me.
Associate/Asst. Master High Court, Bombay
For M/s. Desai & Diwanji
Partner
Advocates for the Plaintiffs.

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