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On the night of July 5, the Tigers launched their first kamikaze operation.
Miller took the wheels of the explosive-packed truck, smiled at everyone as he turned the ignition key and drove it slowly towards the Sri Lankan military camp.
A few moments later all of Jaffna heard a thunderous explosion that brought the complex crashing down in clouds of dust.
Miller had given birth to a deadly tactic that Prabhakaran would employ time and again with devastating consequences to Sri Lanka -- and India.
A fascinating excerpt from M R Narayan Swamy's must read new book, The Rout Of Prabhakaran.
On May 26, 1987, Sri Lanka launched a meticulous military offensive called 'Operation Liberation' involving several thousands of army, navy and air force personnel.
Jaffna was bombed like never before. When Tamils took shelter in churches and Hindu temples, they too came under aerial attacks. Hundreds perished in the rain of death.
Within a week, the entire coastal Vadamarachchi region -- which included Prabhakaran's home base -- was under government control, for the first time in years.
Stung by the military advance, LTTE blamed R&AW for its setback. (Its ideologue Anton) Balasingham charged: 'R&AW knew all the details of the Vadamarachchi operation and when it would begin. But they gave us false information. 'The Sri Lankan troops are going to launch a massive offensive on the Jaffna town, move your troops into that area,' R&AW told us.'
'We believed it and our troops in all other parts of the Jaffna Peninsula were sent into Jaffna town. So, when the government attacked Vadamarachchi, we were defeated.'
An enraged Prabhakaran fretted and fumed when his pleas for military hardware were not entertained by India. He was so desperate for arms and ammunition that he even dispatched written appeals to the Indian government but New Delhi was reluctant. It was New Delhi, however, that came to the rescue of the beleaguered Prabhakaran yet again.
In early June, India -- alleging large-scale starvation in Tamil areas -- sent a flotilla of 19 fishing boats with 38 tons of food and other necessities from Tamil Nadu to Jaffna. The Sri Lankan navy blocked their passage, forcing the boats to return to India.
The following day, after giving Colombo only a 35-minute notice, five Indian Air Force transport planes took off and air-dropped 25 tons of relief material over Jaffna. India warned of severe consequences if the planes were shot. Shocked by the move, Sri Lanka had no choice but to acquiesce.
The incident created bad blood between (Then Sri Lankan president J R ) Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi at a time when they were warming up to each other. An angry Jayewardene called the airdrop a personal affront and accused India of muscle flexing. 'Sri Lanka and Sinhalese people also want peace with the Tamils, but not the kind of peace that comes riding on Indian Air Force planes.'
The Indian action fuelled strong protests among the Sinhalese though the Tamils were pleased. To Sri Lanka, it was evident that it could not carry on with the onslaught against the Tigers. India was now tightening the screws.
Sri Lanka meekly agreed to cooperate when New Delhi decided to send ships loaded with food and relief material to Jaffna in June. The LTTE suspended its military campaign to facilitate the Indian relief effort.
A veritable sea of humanity poured onto the streets of Jaffna to greet the Indian ships docking at the port.
Its occupants included a young Indian diplomat who was destined to play a major role in the life of Prabhakaran in the months to come. His name was Hardeep Singh Puri.
India's Peace Bid
A first secretary in the Indian high commission in Colombo, Puri was a bearded Sikh whose job included keeping an eye on the Sri Lankan political scene for Indian policy formulators. He enjoyed the complete trust of New Delhi's envoy to Sri Lanka, J N Dixit, who specifically chose him to go to Jaffna to gauge the mood for peace.
Desperation laced with a yearning for peace was in the air as Puri, accompanied by a colleague and members of the Indian Red Cross, made his way out of the harbour cheered by tens of thousands of war-weary Tamils.
A middle-aged Tamil man thrust a floral garland on Puri's neck, kissed him on his cheeks and screamed at the top of his voice: "Long Live Mother India!" As if on cue, the crowd took up the slogan, responding with relentless cries of "Long Live Mother India!" and "Long Live Tamil Eelam!"
Puri stayed at a small clean hotel in Jaffna town. Five LTTE members called on him to discuss the modalities of distributing the relief material in LTTE-administered areas. As the discussion turned to the military scene, the Tiger representatives blamed India for their reverses, complaining they did not get adequate military help from New Delhi.
Yogi, a member of the LTTE's political wing, informed Puri that the demand for an independent state of Tamil Eelam was negotiable. This was in complete variance to what Prabhakaran had said in his May Day address. It gave hope to the Indian diplomat. One of Yogi's colleagues feared that if Colombo launched another military offensive, the guerrillas would barely be able to fight for a week or 10 days.
The next morning, a Jaffna Tamil man known to be close to the LTTE dropped in to see Puri. He wanted to know if Puri desired to meet Prabhakaran. "I would love to," Puri replied, "but only if I had permission from my bosses." Back in Colombo, Puri prepared a confidential note for Indian envoy Dixit, saying the LTTE was not averse to talk peace if Prabhakaran's basic concerns were met. The wheels of diplomacy had started rolling again.
Acting under Prabhakaran's orders, another group of LTTE sympathisers in Singapore let New Delhi know through an Indian intermediary that the group would be ready for peace if Sri Lanka met its minimum demands. These included an immediate end to military operations, a merger of the Tamil-populated northern and eastern provinces, as well as adequate devolution of powers to a united Tamil province.
The signals from the Tamil Tigers encouraged Indian and Sri Lankan diplomats to step up their behind-the-scene efforts to hammer out a strategy that would keep the Indian Ocean island nation in one piece while satisfying the LTTE demands.
Against the backdrop of peace overtures, Prabhakaran suddenly fired a hitherto untested weapon against the military: A suicide bomber.
Prabhakaran's Deadly Weapon: The Suicide Bomber
The candidate for the mission was a young guerrilla known by his code name Miller. Prabhakaran was adamant on punishing the army for daring to advance into his home base of Vadamarachchi, which he had presumed to be impregnable.
Miller, a resident of Jaffna, was picked for the desperate task primarily because of his driving skills. But the plan dragged on until the day a peeved Miller told his handler in the LTTE that the rebel group should either carry out the suicide attack or let him off.
Finally, the Tigers picked the target. It was a school building at a place in Jaffna called Nelliady that served as the operational headquarters of the Sri Lankan military. The plan was that Miller would ram a truck packed with explosives into the building, bringing it down and possibly entombing hundreds of soldiers. The LTTE requested him to have a final meeting with his family.
Miller took one last meal with his mother, not letting her know what he was up to. The woman recalled that her son insisted on drinking a soda before going to the LTTE camp.
On the night of July 5, which has since become a red-letter day in the LTTE's blood-soaked calendar, the Tigers launched their first kamikaze operation. Miller took the wheels of the explosive-packed truck, smiled at everyone as he turned the ignition key and drove it slowly towards the military camp. As he approached the school building, he picked up speed.
A few moments later all of Jaffna heard a thunderous explosion that brought the complex crashing down in clouds of dust. Miller was blown apart.
Miller had given birth to a deadly tactic that Prabhakaran would employ time and again with devastating consequences to Sri Lanka -- and India.
By the middle of July India and Sri Lanka were close to an agreement on ending the Tamil conflict. But both countries knew that no accord had any meaning if Prabhakaran vetoed it. His consent was a must.
On July 19, Puri was directed to fly to Jaffna and brief the LTTE chief about Indian efforts to persuade Sri Lanka to give in to Tamil demands. He was told to assure Prabhakaran that LTTE's interests would be taken care of if he cooperated with India.
Puri left for Jaffna in a Sri Lankan air force aircraft. Prabhakaran had agreed to meet him. When LTTE members greeted him in Jaffna, Puri offered to be blindfolded before being taken to Prabhakaran's hideout. The Tigers laughed it away.
One of them commented with a tinge of sarcasm: "Even if you have a computer brain, you will not be able to remember the route."
The Meeting With Prabhakaran
The LTTE chieftain was at a house close to the Jaffna University, waiting at the gate to receive Puri -- a rare honour for any visitor. It was almost 9 pm, and Jaffna's streets were deserted. Almost all the LTTE top guns were present.
Prabhakaran, looking relaxed, listened intently as Puri revealed that Sri Lanka was about to outline a political package that New Delhi felt would be fully responsive to Tamil aspirations. Prabhakaran, however, had a litany of grievances against India that he first wanted to be heard.
He held R&AW responsible for LTTE's rout at Vadamarachchi region in northern Sri Lanka.
"I love India, I can never do anything that harms India," he went on. He claimed he used to literally worship Indira Gandhi, the slain Indian premier, and respected her son and successor Rajiv. But Indian intelligence, he alleged, tried to have him eliminated.
Puri tried to assuage Prabhakaran's hurt feelings by saying that in any family there were bound to be differences of opinion.
Prabhakaran said the purpose behind his complaints was to improve relations with the Indian government. "After all, this is a quarrel between a mother and a child. It is not possible for LTTE to exist without India and your prime minister," he remarked. "Mrs (Indira) Gandhi helped us. She made us what we are."
The Indian diplomat made it clear to Prabhakaran that while India was always friendly with Tamils, it could never accept a break-up of Sri Lanka. The LTTE leader again latched on to his pet subject, underlining the need for a free Tamil state.
Prabhakaran spoke softly, carefully weighing every word. He admitted he had offended the Indian premier in 1985 -- after the failure of the Bhutan talks between Tamil groups and Colombo -- by not responding to his appeals to fly to New Delhi.
But Prabhakaran became agitated and even aggressive when Puri wanted to know why TELO was wiped out. "We had no choice," he argued. TELO, according to the rebel chief, had been conspiring with R&AW to assassinate him. "In such a situation, what do you expect us to do?"
Puri went on to inform Prabhakaran in detail about the wide-ranging discussions going on between New Delhi and Colombo through diplomatic channels. The Sri Lankan president had agreed to sign an agreement with India that would seek to meet Tamil aspirations.
The pact would concede that Sri Lanka was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious plural society and not a Sinhala-Buddhist state, recognise Tamil ethnicity, and grant the status of an official language to Tamil.
The president had also agreed to merge the northern and eastern provinces -- a long-standing demand of Tamil groups -- to form a single administrative unit where Tamils would constitute a majority. The new province, like Indian states, would have its own legislative council and a chief minister.
Of course, in return, the LTTE would have to renounce violence and lay down arms.
Prabhakaran listened patiently, but raised a number of questions. He wanted to know if, at some stage, Colombo could forcibly settle Sinhalese in Tamil areas, whether the Home Guards (an undisciplined force that was anti-Tamil) and Israeli-trained Special Task Force would be disbanded or not, and who would police the Tamil region.
Prabhakaran, however, ruled that no agreement would be acceptable to him unless Sri Lanka disbanded all newly established military camps in the coastal region of Vadamarachchi. If this was done, he was willing to proceed further on the path of peace.
"If Tamil political demands are met, LTTE would not require arms."
Puri asked Prabhakaran if he would like to settle the issue directly with the Sri Lankan president. No way, the LTTE chief shot back. He thought it was better for Rajiv Gandhi to negotiate with Jayewardene.
Prabhakaran had his own reasons: "Once the Indian prime minister and the Sri Lankan president sign an agreement, it would not be possible for Jayewardene to go back on the commitments he gives to Gandhi."
The Indian diplomat had one last question: Since the LTTE would have a very crucial role to play in any political settlement, would Prabhakaran like to visit India?
India Wanted Prabhakaran to Visit New Delhi
Prabhakaran harped on his suspicion that the Indian intelligence agency had tried to have him murdered and that is why he quit India in January 1987. So he would not undertake any more clandestine journeys to India -- as he had done all these years.
"So far we have been crossing the Palk Strait illegally," he said, referring to the narrow strip of sea that divides Sri Lanka and India. "If I can be invited with full honours, then India will be according a pride of place to Tamils. You would be honouring the Tamils."
Puri wanted a more specific answer. He asked if Prabhakaran would like to be invited to New Delhi. Before the guerrilla leader could respond, his political aide Yogi remarked in English: "If your prime minister invites us, we will certainly respond positively."
Prabhakaran hardened his stand by the time Puri returned to Jaffna four days later. He complained that Sri Lankan commandos were harassing and killing innocent Tamils in the eastern province and declared that the LTTE would never surrender its weapons until all army camps were wound up in the Vadamarachchi region.
When the Indian diplomat informed Prabhakaran later that New Delhi was ready to receive Prabhakaran, the LTTE chief insisted that he was not willing to give up the concept of an independent State yet as that would enable Sri Lanka to exterminate the Tigers. "If we give up weapons and renounce violence, my boys will be wiped out."
Puri was surprised. He pointed out to Prabhakaran that the situation provided him a historic opportunity to mend fences with the Indian leadership. India had extracted a package from Colombo that favoured the Tamils. It was important for Prabhakaran to think about the suffering of the Tamils because of the continuing war.
The diplomat added: "I have instructions to invite you to pay a visit to India tomorrow." Prabhakaran pondered and asked for time to think. After a couple of minutes, the LTTE chief muttered softly: "OK, I will come."
Prabhakaran, however, had some requests. He wanted to be accompanied by two or three bodyguards besides his political aides Yogi and Thileepan. He wanted Balasingham to join him in Madras. He wanted his wife and two children also to travel to Madras where they could meet her parents. He wanted to call on Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MGR before flying to New Delhi.
By the dawn of July 24, 1987, both the Indian prime minister and the Sri Lankan president were informed about Prabhakaran's climb down. Rajiv Gandhi was particular that Prabhakaran should be fully involved in the peace process.
Excerpted from The Rout Of Prabhakaran by M R Narayan Swamy, with the kind permission of Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. The book is priced Rs 895.