column on afghanistan

Reports of a US demarche to India asking it to stay out of Afghanistan's politics may or may not be true.

 

Officially, New Delhi has denied that such a demarche was ever issued.

 

Yet national security adviser Brajesh Mishra, quizzed specifically about this at the end of his US visit last week, said that "that incident is behind us now," implying that the issue had been raised and discussed. 

 

Ostensibly, this demarche called for India to “slow down” it's political and reconstruction work in the war-ravaged nation, since this was impeding Pakistan's strongman Pervez Musharraf from cracking down on  hardliners (read terrorists) within Pakistan. 

 

If indeed such a request was issued, it indicates a totally juvenile world view on the part of Washington.

 

It also reflects Musharraf's ability to make Washington dance to his tune by bringing up the ‘T' word. 

 

Musharraf  reportedly threatened to “step up” activities in Afghanistan if India opened up consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, as promised by  External affairs minister Yashwant Sinha during his visit to Afghanistan in August. 

 

This apparently prompted American fears of fresh terror attacks on its forces or on the floundering Karzai regime, whose writ is yet to extend beyond Kabul.

 

To this, the reported Indian response was that while it had no problems at all with Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan if it involved development work, if it involved attempts to recreate or revive Islamabad's Frankenstein of the Taliban, why, that was the US' problem.

 

But what, precisely, are Islamabad's concerns about Indian involvement in Afghanistan?

 

The primary one, of course, is the possibility of New Delhi getting too cosy with the powers that be or will be in Afghanistan. This would give RAW a foothold on Pakistan's western borders, already in turmoil over the Pusthun demand for a separate homeland despite the immense autonomy these tribals already have in the frontier provinces. 

 

And though it tried, Islamabad can hardly match India's generosity vis-à-vis Afghanistan without severely denting its already scant treasury.

A small sampling of India's largesse includes three Boeing aircraft  ‘gifted'  to Ariana, Afghanistan's national airline which had been reduced to just one airworthy craft during the Taliban regime. Fifty buses to revive Kabul's public transport system.

And $100 million in financial assistance, of which $10 million was transferred as cash in July tyo augment the Karzai government's budget, while another $25 million has already been converted into grants.   Then there's  $  4 million to revive Kabul's Indira Gandhi hospital, a legacy of the 1960s which already has some Indian doctors at work . 

 

Another million or three US dollars will be spent on upgrading and establishing Information Technology centres at Kabul's Habibia School, an institution which New Delhi seems to have adopted.  Millions of tones of wheat, medicines, blankets, the list is long and comprehensive.  And this is just the official list.

 

Besides, the first lot of Afghans is already training to be doctors at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in New Delhi. While another 250 are training in various bureaucratic institutions across India, including the foreign services and police institutes.

 

All this gives New Delhi considerable leverage in Kabul. But to hedge its bets, India is also maintaining close ties with the Uzbek and Tajik warlords who rule the countryside, cashing in on the fact that New Delhi had overtly and covertly funded their war against the Taliban long before 9/11 changed the world. 

 

So perhaps Musharraf has reason to be worried. 

 

Add India's relations  with Russia (whose president Vladimir Putin came out strongly against Islamabad during his recent India visit ) and Iran (President Khatami is the chief guest for India's Republic Day bash coming up next month), and his worries take on a whole new dimension altogether.  

 

For these nations, along with India, encircle Pakistan.

 

But before we get carried away, it must also be kept in mind that despite India's political and economical largesse, and despite major Afghan cabinet ministers—defence minister General Mohammad Fahim, foreign minister Mohammad-Abdullah Abdullah  and education minister Yunis Qanooni to name a few---being blatantly pro Indian, President Hamid Karzai is essentially an American puppet. 

 

And as long as Washington continues to hail Pakistan as it front line ally in the war against terror, he is unlikely to do or allow anything that threatens Pakistan and it's “war” against terror.

 

And no matter how many spooks they cram the consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad with, the presence of American troops and monitoring equipment on Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan will surely cramp RAW's style.

 

Besides, the last thing Karzai wants is a overtly hostile neighbour.

For despite its depleted treasury, Pakistan too has pledged $ 10 million in aid, and at a press conference addressed by him and Karzai in Kabul in April, Musharraf stressed that  "We will not allow each other's countries to be used against the interests [of one another]."

Even earlier, in February, Mr Karzai reassured journalists in Islamabad that the innate Afghan suspicion of  Pakistan owing to its support to the Taleban regime was “a thing of the past,” and as a goodwill gesture  said Afghanistan would release young Pakistanis captured while fighting for the Taleban regime.

Which is why Pakistan is also included in the list of “neighbouring” nations invited to sign a friendship treaty with Afghanistan on December 22, which marks a year of Karzai's rule in Kabul.  

 

Apart from Pakistan and India, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Saudi Arabia are on that list. The invitation to the respective foreign ministers have already gone out, and it will interesting to watch how the two nations of the subcontinent interact there, if at all.  

 

But  while Musharraf's concerns over Indian involvement in Afghanistan is understandable, Washington's raising the subject with India---whether or not it was in the form of a demarche is immaterial---is not.

 

India has made no bones about its rancour over the mollycoddling of Musharraf, and the fact that Washington should even raise such a subject with India at a time like this makes one wonder what the State department policy wonks have been smoking. 

 

After all, if the US can ignore India's concerns over Pakistan, why should it even expect us to care about it's  ‘concern' for  Afghanistan?