Sri Lanka inches towards victory, not peace

Jaya-sikuru in Sinhalese means ''certain victory''. Film star-politician Vijaya Kumaranatunga had acted in a film with that title before the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna, the right-wing Sinhala hard-liners, assassinated him in 1988. Today, the Sri Lankan government headed by his wife Chandrika has named its military offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam as ''Operation Jaya-sikuri''.

Though victory is not yet certain for the Colombo forces in the internecine war that has been raging for over a decade, they are now closer to victory than in the past, when Chandrika launched ''Operation Riveresa'' and ''Operation Sath Jaya''. The army has been able to capture and consolidate LTTE-held areas with every new military exercise, and could confine the Tamil militant group to its heartland Mulaiteevu.

Though the LTTE has been fighting back, the militants's gains have not been able to change the course of the ethnic war, nor halt the progress of the government troops. Loss of men, material and morale have delayed matters for the troops, but not stopped them altogether.

The Tamil militants' early victories owed it to their motivation and preparedness, both of which were sourly lacking in the Sri Lankan troops. Mostly a ceremonial army, the Sri Lankan military had to summon help from India when the JVP raided the capital in the late sixties.

The long-drawn-out battle, facilitated partly by the then Sri Lankan president J R Jayewardene's decision to induct the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, has invigorated the local forces. So has ''external help'', in the form of military hardware, training and strategy from Israel, Pakistan and the West, of which the LTTE has been making a mention at every available opportunity.

If the years that have rolled by have strategically strained and numerical weakened the LTTE, which had promised a ''Tamil homeland'' in the shortest span of time, the Rajiv Gandhi assassination too had played a key role. Overnight, the LTTE became an untouchable for the international community, and even neutral nations have heaped scorn on its leadership.

The British involvement now, in trying to find a political solution to the ethnic row, has closed another door on the LTTE: It implies that London would not entertain its operations, both of the diplomatic and military-procurement varieties, from its soil. Other Western governments following suit would only be a foregone conclusion.

Frustrated civilians, who deserted Jaffna in response to the LTTE's ''mass exodus'' call in mid-1995, have been returning to their homes, now under military protection, in droves with each passing day. Nothing could have spoilt the LTTE war effort than this, as the civilians find to their pleasant surprise that the Sri Lankan forces and the Sinhala administrators are not the villains that they had been made out to be.

On the political front too, President Chandrika Kumaranatunga has been able to make some progress. Her initiative to go to the Tamil masses and the Sinhala voters over the heads of their partisan political leaders, which initially did not produce great results, is now paying dividends. Non-LTTE Tamil political groups are willing to discuss among themselves and also with the government officials Chandrika's proposals for devolution of power. Even the once-hostile opposition United Nationalist Party of Jayewardene, is willing to co-operate with the government, thanks to British mediation.

Chandrika's proposals do not grant a unified Tamil province, combining the North and the East, as promised even under the Rajiv-Jayewardene accord. There are also questions on the powers of the provincial government and that of the federal regime. Such details have to be worked out to the satisfaction of the Tamil and Sinhala groups, without hurting the Tamil Muslims who now want a separate province of their own.

Though the LTTE has been suffering reverses, it cannot be ignored if any peace proposal has to be worked in the Tamil areas. A political solution, where the defeated militant group does not feel humiliated, is the only way out. This is what Colombo is expected to accomplish with the British assistance and negotiating skills.

The LTTE's predicament, if any, on this front could be understandable. For starters, it would have no ''Tamil homeland''. That would be a terrible letdown for the Tamil community which lost tens of thousands of its members in the last 14 years. There is also the possibility of non-LTTE Tamil groups mustering their strength to take on the organisation in any electoral battle.

Also of significance is the anticipated demand for a war crimes trial against the LTTE, and Colombo's commitment that LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran, if sighted, would be sent to India to face the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. Against this will be the LTTE counter-plea for legal protection, and physical need for retaining arms to escape personal annihilation.

As of now, it is Chandrika Kumaranatunga who stands between chaos and diplomacy on the one hand, and between anarchy and accelerated battle on the other. The kind of chaos and anarchy that had raged under weak presidents, when the LTTE had a free run of the Tamil areas. A solution has to come from her, not without her.

Britain steps in as India refuses to touch Sri Lanka with a bargepole