'When the chief minister saw how Manoj Jarange Patil had successfully held the state government hostage to his whims, Eknath Shinde knew he had a very clear chance of enamouring himself to these Maratha agitators by accepting Patil's demands.'
On the morning of January 27, some would say, Maratha agitation leader Manoj Jarange Patil (MJP) and Maharashtra Chief Minister Eknath Shinde created history as Shinde fed Patil a glass of juice and handed over a government resolution (GR) that would make over 25 million Marathas eligible for reservations in governments jobs and quotas.
This was made possible by addition of two seemingly innocuous, but hugely significant, words sage-soyre -- a major point of contention for MJP and Maratha agitators -- in this GR.
Sage-soyre, roughly put means a chain of relatives that links those who have been issued Kunbi certificates to their relatives and their relatives in turn leading to exponential rise in issuance of Kunbi certificates to Marathas who can then become eligible for reservations under the OBC quota.
Legal interpretation and challenges to the inclusion of sage-soyre notwithstanding, MJP (and his almost 200,000 supporters), who had begun a sort of do-or-die march towards Mumbai from his native town of Antarwali Sarati in Jalna district on January 20 claimed victory on the day after the Republic Day and returned home happy on this sage-soyre note.
Political observer Vivek Bhavsar explains to Prasanna D Zore/Rediff.comthe layers lying underneath this agitation, the role played by prominent political figures in Maharashtra and how they could lose or benefit from the consequences that would play themselves out in the days to come.
Has Manoj Jarange Patil won the day for the Marathas agitating for reservations in government jobs and educational institutions and should this be seen as surrender by chief minister Eknath Shinde?
I believe this is neither anybody's victory nor defeat; neither surrender nor masterstroke.
The handing over of draft copy of the government resolution accepting MJP's demand for inclusion of sage-soyre (a chain of relatives that links those who have been issued Kunbi certificates to their relatives and their relatives in turn leading to exponential rise in issuance of Kunbi certificates to Marathas who can then become eligible for reservations under the OBC quota) of those already holding Kunbi caste certificates as eligible for reservations could have multiple, complex repercussions on both Maratha and OBC politics in the state.
There is a claim -- not allegations -- by some political analysts that whatever happened at Beed (Antarvali Sarati on August 29, 2023, when the police lathi-charged supporters of Manoj Jarange Patil who was agitating for Maratha reservations) had the blessings of Sharad Pawar.
When MJP and his band of Maratha agitators arrived at Vashi on January 25 it was Jitendra Awhad (a staunch loyalist of Sharad Pawar) who arranged for the food and water for these agitators. All those heading this agitation stayed put at the Vashi APMC market, which is controlled by another Pawar loyalist Shashikant Shinde. It looks like this agitation too had the blessings of Pawar.
Whatever the speculation or claims and counter claims, the hand of Chief Minister Eknath Shinde in instigating, nursing and nourishing MJP is also clearly evident.
Both Pawar and Shinde have their own reasons to propel MJP as the leader of the dispossessed, deprived, sections of Marathas agitating for reservations in government jobs and educational institutions.
These are the people who are Kunbis, who were never part of the Maratha ruling elite who wielded control over the corridors of power, who did not have adequate political, social or educational representation.
The lobby which supports Pawar-politics belong to the 96 kuli Marathas (the landed gentry, sort of Maratha nobles) lined their own pockets without benefitting these subaltern Marathas.
If you look at the leadership that emerged from the 56-odd Maratha Kranti Morchas during Devendra Fadnavis's stint as chief minister (between 2015 and 2019) all belonged to the top echelons of 96 kuli Marathas.
Fadnavis very smartly handled those 56 agitations and the situation never spilled out of control in the streets.
What made MJP what he is today? How did he become such a powerful Maratha leader?
When MJP first began his agitation and fasts to demand reservations for Marathas last year he did not have any support from the political elite in the state. The Maratha Kranti Morcha, the Maratha Sakal Samaj stayed away from MJP during this phase of his agitations.
No sooner did MJP begin emerging as a leader in his own right, he adopted a daring stand telling his supporters he will never hobnob with politicians -- among the ruling parties or even the Opposition -- which touched a raw chord among the ordinary, deprived, dispossessed Marathas.
It is quite a popular perception among Marathas about those Maratha leaders who promised them the moon, but instead filled their own coffers on the back of their support.
When MJP began publicly stating that he will never betray their trust and hold all parleys from open platforms, he won the wholehearted support of this huge section of Marathas. His popularity started climbing the charts, his geographical reach too expanded among Marathas across the state.
One must remember how he brought the entire Maharashtra cabinet to its knees last September -- something which he had already promised his supporters he would do for these ministers and the chief minister had neglected his agitations till then.
Not just the cabinet but even top leaders from the BJP, NCP and Congress tried to please MJP just so that his supporters -- a huge voter base in the state -- feel placated.
But after handing over the GR to MJP at a public meeting in Vashi followed by a bombastic speech, the chief minister seems to have emerged a hero. Was this a well-crafted move from the chief minister?
When the chief minister saw how MJP had successfully held the entire cabinet and the state government hostage to his whims riding on the huge support he won from a large section of Marathas who now backed MJP to the hilt, Shinde knew that he had a very clear chance of enamouring himself to these Maratha agitators by accepting the demands put forth by MJP.
The fact that Ajit Pawar, another popular Maratha leader, and the estranged nephew of Sharad Pawar, who split the NCP last year and joined hands with Shinde-Fadnavis government, was now also part of the government made Shinde a tad insecure.
He desperately needed a voter base among the Marathas, among whom -- despite being a 96 kuli Maratha -- the chief minister holds no sway at all as all his political career took shape on the Shiv Sena's anvil in Thane under the leadership of Shiv Sena supremo Balasaheb Thackeray and his (Shinde's) mentor Anand Dighe.
In this battle between the dispossessed and socially-economically upward Marathas, Shinde clearly saw a winning proposition if only he placated MJP and his supporters. He knew it would immediately catapult him to the status of a hero among these sections of Marathas.
Since this realisation dawned upon him, Shinde has been supporting MJP openly as well as discreetly.
Interestingly, ever since MJP emerged as a leader in his own right since last September when an agitation he was heading at Antarwali Sarati village in Ambad taluka of Jalna district turned violent and MJP's stature as a leader of substance further strengthened, he never indulged in mudslinging against Eknath Shinde.
Are you suggesting that the match between Eknath Shinde and MJP was fixed?
MJP publicly targeted Sharad Pawar, Ajit Pawar, Devendra Fadnavis, Chhagan Bhujbal and Ashok Chavan but always praised the chief minister. He would often say in his public meetings that he trusted Shinde and saw in him an honest politician who could deliver the reservation goods to the Marathas, makes one feel that there could be a settlement between MJP and Shinde.
If you even look at the turn of events since MJP began his long march from Anatrawali Sarati to Mumbai on January 20 -- claiming it as his 'do or die' battle for Maratha reservations -- it was evident he was doing Shinde's bidding.
When he began, MJP had stridently claimed that no matter what he would hit Mumbai's Azad Maidan on January 26 and whatever the outcome of his negotiations with the government he would reach Azad Maidan, where he had exhorted all his supporters to congregate on the scheduled date.
But instead of heading towards Azad Maidan on the night of January 25 and continuing his negotiation with and agitation against the government from there, he and his supporters stayed the night at Vashi, New Mumbai, even as the government assured him they would soon issue a government resolution accepting all the demands of the Maratha reservation agitators.
This posturing helped both Shinde and MJP.
How?
By this move, MJP portrayed himself as a reasonable leader who didn't favour disrupting traffic or cause a law and order situation in Mumbai. The city police and state administration were already busy grappling with communal tensions at Mira Road in Thane district and in this situation an additional two lakh agitators entering the city would have further compounded the situation.
Shinde too shone in the limelight on January 26 when he gave the symbolic glass of juice to MJP to end his fast at Vashi's Shivaji Maidan and handed him the GR that accepted one of the most important demands of the agitators -- that to include the sage-soyre clause that would open the floodgates for, from 54 lakh (5.4 million) Marathas who have been found eligible to be included as Kunbi OBCs, to roughly 2.5 crore (25 million) Marathas to become eligible for reservations in government jobs and educational institutions.
In fact, when Shinde left for his farmhouse in Satara district even as Jarange was on his way to Mumbai, the two leaders shared telephonic messages, in which Shinde assured MJP that he would get the GR accepting all his demands but requested him to halt his march at Vashi instead of entering Mumbai.
It was only after these exchanges it was decided between the two that MJP would extend his deadline of entering Mumbai by a day. Till the very last minute MJP was adamant that whatever the outcome of the negotiations he would hit Azad Maidan on January 26.