'Indian subcontinent crucial to China's defence strategy'
The Indian subcontinent and Myanmar will always be the highest
priority of China in its preparation for the "ultimate confrontation"
with the West.
China's firm commitment to communism and its growing economic
prowess will have a decisive influence on the region and the country
will concentrate on the subcontinent either for forming regional
defence blocs or exerting a strong influence on the West.
"Undoubtedly, along the Pacific rim, China has already emerged
as an undisputed superpower," says Group Captain (Retd) M
Kamaluddin of the Bangladesh Air Force in his latest book 100
F-16s And Agni: The Balance Of Poverty. The book's been published
in India.
However, sale of missiles along with sensitive military technology
to the underdeveloped countries, including Pakistan, by China,
will certainly make it ''unfriendly'' for the nations adversely
affected, the author says while stressing that only a proper appreciation
of issues of national security in countries of South Asia could
contribute towards reduction in defence expenditures.
The substantial ''peace dividend'', thus accrued, could be applied
towards developmental goals to declare a war on poverty, plaguing
these countries.
Calling for re-orientation of the defence policy to improve the
quality of life of ordinary citizens, Kamaluddin refers to Pakistan,
saying the issue of ''national security versus need versus cost
versus affordability'' had never been subjected to scrutiny by
the nation except by the professionals who ''gleefully expanded
their empires with no hope in sight of ever solving the problems
for which they have been milking the country dry''.
Besides devoting a detailed chapter to China and how a meaningful
relationship between the Asian giant and the countries of Asia
is imperative for Asian and global peace, the book deals with
arms race in South Asia, which only accentuates poverty, and the
cataclysmic disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Following the global change in the balance of power after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the author suggests, if India
and Pakistan could set goals for removing obstacles impeding their
social and economic progress, it would make the subcontinent the
third important decision making centre after the United States
and western Europe.
Delving into history, he says it had been a Chinese obsession
to try to isolate India and alienate its neighbours against it.
The benefit of China's 1962 attack on India was the gain of Pakistan
as a ''dependable friend'' in the region and ''without even thinking,
Pakistan leapt right into China's overstretched arms'', he feels.
On March 2, 1963, then Pakistani Foreign Minister Z A Bhutto and
his Chinese counterpart Chen Yi signed a hurriedly executed border
pact in Peking under which Pakistan was given 1,350 square miles
while China retained 2,050 square miles on a portion of land which
is an integral part of Kashmir, Kamaluddin says.
Listing the strategic advantages accruing to China from the deal,
he says it thwarted the possibility of a solution to the Kashmir
issue between India and Pakistan as ''any solution will require
dissolution of the agreement which China will not allow Pakistan
to do''. Besides, the pact allowed China to secure and extend
the Sinkiang-Gartok Road across the Northeast Aksai Chin Bulge
and have a permanent foothold in the strategically important region.
''It also injected a heavy dose of lasting poison in Indo-Pak
relations.''
''China's major and vital point of strategic focus will always
be in central Asia, especially on both the flanks of the Aksai
Chin Bulge. Hence Chinese help anywhere in the region must be
observed and evaluated carefully, more so by the recipient country,''
the book says.
The entire western, southwestern and southern China being a chain
of rugged mountains, the Chinese army in this terrain will always
feel at home in offence as well as in defence.
China is alarmed at the possible withdrawal of the United States
forces from Southeast Asia because it would lead to major strategic
shift in the balance of power favouring Russia, Japan and the
ASEAN countries which till today are suspicious of China, the
author says.
Kamaluddin also analyses the 1965 Indo-Pak war and concludes that
Ayub Khan's decision to plunge Pakistan in the war was based on
his perception of the situation not as a statesman or political
leader of a nation, but as a soldier.
He says ''Ayub had vested himself with the 'trinity' of war -the
people, the government and the military... And went to war against
the better judgment of most of his senior military advisors.''
He also discusses the backlashes Pakistan suffered as a conduit
of the inexhaustible supply of US weapons for Afghan rebels following
the entry of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979.
Pakistan now has the dubious record of having the largest number
of weapons per head in the world which has given a fillip to ethnic,
communal and political killings across the country. With increased
opium production in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet
intervention, Pakistan has become the most important country in
the Golden Crescent for the drug business, he concludes.
UNI
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