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Point 1: Set up a national commission of professionals with no political agenda, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, to inquire into all the major terrorist strikes that have taken place in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir since November 2007, and task it to submit its report within four months, with no extensions given. Its charter will be not the investigation of the criminal cases arising from these terrorist strikes, but the investigation of the deficiencies and sins of commission and omission in our counter-terrorism agencies at the Centre and in the states, which made these strikes possible.
Point 2: Induct proved experts in terrorism and counter-terrorism from the Intelligence Bureau, the state police and the Army into the R&AW at senior levels. Presently, the R&AW does not have any such expertise at senior levels. Of the four officers at the top of the pyramid, two are generalists, one is an expert in Pakistan (political) and the other in China (political).
Point 3: A similar induction from the state police and the Army would be necessary in the case of IB too. Since I have no personal knowledge of the officers at the top of its pyramid, I am not in a position to be specific.
Point 4: Make the IB the nodal point for all liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies in respect of terrorism, instead of the R&AW. Give the IB direct access to all foreign internal intelligence and security agencies, instead of having to go through the R&AW.
Point 5: Have a common database on terrorism shared by the IB and the R&AW directly accessible by authorised officers of the two bodies through a secure password.
Point 6: Make the multi-disciplinary centre of the IB function as it was meant to function when it was created -- as a centre for the continuous identification of gaps and deficiencies in the available intelligence and for removing them and for effective follow-up action.
Point 7: Revive the covert action capability of the R&AW and strengthen it. Its charter should make it clear that it will operate only in foreign territory and not in Indian territory. Give it specific, time-bound tasks. All covert actions should be cleared and co-ordinated by the R&AW. Other agencies should not be allowed to indulge in covert actions.
Point 8: The National Security Guards was created as a special intervention force to deal with terrorist situations such as hijacking and hostage-taking. Stop using it for VIP security purposes. Station one battalion each of the NSG in Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bengaluru. Ensure that its regional deployment does not affect its in-service training. Review the rapid response capability of the NSG in the light of the Mumbai experience and remove loopholes. In handling the Kandahar hijacking of 1999 and the Mumbai terrorist strikes, the delay in the response by the NSG would appear to have been due to a delay in getting an aircraft for moving the NSG personnel to Mumbai from Delhi.
Point 9:Give the police in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bengaluru a special intervention capability to supplement that of the NSG.
Point 10: After the series of hijackings by the Khalistani terrorists in the early 1980s, Indira Gandhi had approved a proposal for training Indians in dealing with hostage situations and hostage negotiation techniques by foreign intelligence agencies, which have acknowledged expertise in these fields. The training slots offered by the foreign agencies have been largely monopolised by the IB and R&AW. The utilisation of these training slots and the selection of officers for the training should be decided by the NSA -- with one-third of the slots going to central agencies, one-third to the NSG and one-third to the state police. It is important to build up a core of terrorism and counter-terrorism expertise in all metro towns.
Point 11: The IB's multi-disciplinary centre should have a constantly updated database of all serving and retired officers at the Centre and in the states who had undergone overseas training, and also of all serving and retired officers and non-governmental figures who have expertise in terrorism and counter-terrorism so that their expertise could be tapped, when needed.
Point 12: Strengthen the role of the police stations in counter-terrorism in all major cities. Make it clear to all station house officers that their record in preventing acts of terrorism, in contributing to the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases and in consequence management after a terrorist strike will be an important factor in assessing their suitability for further promotion. Revive and strengthen the beat system, revive and intensify the local inquiries for suspicious activities in all railway stations, bus termini, airports, hotels, inns and other places and improve police-community relations.
An important observation of the UK's security and intelligence committee of the prime minister, which enquired into the London blasts of July 2005, was that no counter-terrorism strategy will succeed unless it is based on the co-operation of the community from which the terrorists have arisen. The UK now has what they call a community-based counter-terrorism strategy. The willingness of different communities to co-operate will largely depend on the relations of the police officers at different levels with the leaders and prominent members of the communities.
Point 13: Adopt the British practice of having counter-terrorism security advisers in police stations. Post them in all urban police stations. Their job will be to constantly train the PS staff in the performance of their counter-terrorism duties, to improve relations with the communities and to closely interact with owners of public places such as hotels, restaurants, shopping malls etc and voluntarily advise them on the security precautions to be taken to prevent terrorist strikes on soft targets and to mitigate the consequences if strikes do take place despite the best efforts of the police to prevent them.
Point 14: Stop using the National Security Council Secretariat as a dumping ground for retired officers, who are favoured by the government. The NSCS cannot be effective in its role of national security management if it is not looked upon with respect by the serving officers. The serving officers look upon the retired officers of the NSCS as living in the past and in a make-believe world of their own totally cut off from the ground realities of today in national security management. The NSCS should be manned only by serving officers of acknowledged capability for thinking and action.
Point 15: Strengthen the role of the National Security Advisory Board as a government-sponsored think tank of non-governmental experts in security matters to assist the NSCA and the NSA. Give it specific terms of reference instead of letting it free lance as it often does. It should be discouraged from undertaking esoteric studies.
Point 16: Set up a separate Joint Intelligence Committee to deal with internal security. Assessment of intelligence having a bearing on internal security requires different expertise and different analytical tools than assessment of intelligence having a bearing on external security. In 1983, Indira Gandhi, then prime minister, bifurcated the JIC and created a separate JIC for internal security. Rajiv Gandhi reversed her decision. Her decision was wise and needs to be revived.
Point 17: Set up a national counter-terrorism centre under the national security adviser to ensure joint operational action in all terrorism-related matters. It can be patterned after a similar institution set up in the US under director, national intelligence after 9/11. The national commission set up by the US Congress to enquire into the 9/11 terrorist strikes had expressed the view that better co-ordination among the various agencies will not be enough and that what was required was a joint action command similar to the joint chiefs of staff in the armed forces. Its tasks should be to monitor intelligence collection by various agencies, avoid duplication of efforts and resources, integrate the intelligence flowing from different agencies and foreign agencies, analyse and assess the integrated intelligence and monitor follow-up action by the police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other concerned agencies.
Every agency is equally and jointly involved and responsible for the entire counter-terrorism process starting from collection to action on the intelligence collected. If such a system had existed, post-Mumbai complaints such as those of the Intelligence Bureau and R&AW that the advisories issued by them on the possibility of a sea-borne attack by the Lashkar e Tayiba on Mumbai were not acted upon by the Mumbai police would not have arisen because the IB and the R&AW would have been as responsible for follow-up action as the Mumbai police.
Point 18: The practice of the privileged direct access to the prime minister by the chiefs of the IB and R&AW, which came into force under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, should be vigorously enforced. This privileged direct access is utilised by the intelligence chiefs to bring their concerns over national security and over inaction by the agencies responsible for follow-up on their reports to the personal notice of the prime minister and seek his intervention. If the intelligence chiefs had brought to the notice of the prime minister the alleged inaction of the Mumbai police on their reports, he might have intervened and issued the required political directive to the chief minister of Maharashtra.
Point 19: Either create a separate ministry of internal security or strengthen the role of the existing department of internal security in the ministry of home affairs and make it responsible for dealing with internal security operationally under the over-all supervision of the home minister.
Point 20:Either create a separate federal terrorism investigation agency or empower the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate all cases involving terrorism of a pan-Indian dimension. It need not take up cases where terrorism is confined to a single state or a small region such as terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir or the Al Umma in Tamil Nadu. It should be able to take up the cases for investigation without the need for prior permission from the governments of the states affected. It should not have any responsibility for investigating crimes other than terrorism. If its charter is expanded to cover other crimes too, there will be political opposition.
There is a lot of confusion about this concept of a federal terrorism investigation agency. Many critics ask when the IB is there, what is the need for another central agency. The IB is an intelligence collection agency and not an investigation agency. The IB has no locus standi in the Indian criminal laws. It collects intelligence and not evidence usable in a court of law. It cannot arrest and interrogate a suspect or search premises or perform other tasks of a similar nature, which can be performed only by police officers of the rank of station house officers. The IB officers are not recognised as equivalent to SHOs.
Point 21: Set up a taskforce consisting of three senior and distinguished directors-general of police and ask it to come up with a list of recommendations for strengthening the powers of the police in respect of prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related offences and the capabilities of the police in counter-terrorism and implement its recommendations. This is the only way of getting round the present political deadlock over the revival of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
Point 22: Expedite the erection of the border fence on the border with Bangladesh without worrying about opposition from Bangladesh.
Point 23: Start a crash programme for the identification of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and for deporting them. Ban the employment of immigrants from Bangladesh anywhere in Indian territory.
Point 24: Strict immigration control is an important part of counter-terrorism The post -9/11 safety of the US is partly due to the tightening up of immigration procedures and their strict enforcement. Among the best practices adopted by the US and emulated by others are: photographing and finger-printing of all foreigners on arrival, closer questioning of Pakistanis and persons of Pakistani origin etc. We have not yet adopted any of these practices. Hotels and other places of residence should be banned from giving rooms to persons without a departure card and without a valid immigration stamp in their passports. They should be required to take xerox copies of the first page and the page containing the immigration stamp of the passports of all foreigners and also the departure card stapled to the passport and send them to their local police station every morning.
All immigration relaxations introduced in the case of Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals and persons of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin should be cancelled with immediate effect. The requirement of police reporting by them should be rigorously enforced. It should be made obligatory for all persons hosting Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to report to the local police about their guests. A vigorous drive should be undertaken for tracing all Pakistanis and Bangladeshis overstaying in India after the expiry of their visas and for expelling them.
Point 25: The MEA's capability for terrorism-related diplomacy should be strengthened by creating a separate division for this purpose. It should continuously brief all foreign governments about the role of Pakistan and Bangladesh in supporting terrorism in Indian territory and press for action against them.
Point 26: The Mumbai strikes have revealed serious gaps in our maritime security on our Western coast. This is partly the result of our over-focus on the Look East policy and the neglect of the Look West dimension. This was corrected earlier this year. Despite this, there are apparently major gaps and an alleged failure by the naval and Coast Guard authorities to act on the reports of IB and R&AW about likely sea borne threats from the LeT. The identification and removal of the gaps need immediate attention. The Mumbai offshore oil installations and the nuclear and space establishments on the Western coast are also vulnerable to sea-borne terrorist strikes.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)