Kargil: Did India Punish Pakistan Enough?

India failed to extract the 'price' from Pakistan for its Kargil misadventure.
The price could have been military in terms of loss of territory/soldiers/equipment or destruction of terrorist training infrastructure.

Giving a 'face saving' option to Pakistan proved disastrous for the future, asserts Colonel Anil A Athale (retd).

Now that the dust has settled in the battlefield, 25 years later an exercise to discover the larger picture and the 'truth' is rewarding.

But like the seven blind men and an elephant, the exercise would be futile if the approach is narrow and is seen missing the main point.

India obviously won the battle, thanks to the outstanding bravery, devotion to duty and raw courage displayed by our soldiers. No praise is high for them.

But the central point of this episode is neither intelligence failure nor the initial tactical blunders of underestimating the enemy strength. It was the failure of Indian DETERRENCE.

In that sense it was a national failure and ought to have prompted a radical rethink in our whole approach to Pakistan.

I had attended a presentation by a top military officer on Kargil and had asked this very question.

It appears that the higher leadership had not calculated the harm this precedent would set for the future.

An American spokesman hit the nail on the head when he said that Pakistan had broken the unwritten law of the nuclear game -- no nuclear weapon State directly invades another nuclear weapon State!

It is this 'law' that protected the sentry at Check Point Charlie at the Berlin Wall throughout the Cold War.

There are indeed many reasons why the US or even China opposed Pakistan, ranging from the US desire to build India as a counter weight to China and the Chinese anxiety to stop India from moving too close to the US.

But the principal reason why these countries sided with India is that Pakistan broke this unwritten law and brought the world close to a nuclear exchange.

All nations understand the consequences for mankind that will follow from breaking the taboo on USE OF NUKES: International anarchy.

India had obviously failed to inflict sufficient punishment on Pakistan for the transgression of the Line of Control.

The talk in Pakistan of there being many more Kargils in future was a pointer in that direction.

The Kargil intrusion was a classic case of attack by infiltration. Presence of regular Pakistani soldiers, heavy weaponry with the intruders and close support given by Pakistani artillery, are all dead giveaways.

The whole world therefore accepted that it was an attack by Pakistan on Indian territory.

The Indian response in confining our action to our side of the LoC had set a dangerous precedent. Soon Pakistan was back at its game of proxy war.

The world and Pakistan expected India to observe similar restraint. This gave a free pass to Pakistan to bleed India to death.

The nadir of this was reached when after the terror attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, directly attributed to Pakistani citizens, India did not react.

India had failed to extract the 'price' from Pakistan for its Kargil misadventure. The price could have been military in terms of loss of territory/soldiers/equipment or destruction of terrorist training infrastructure.

The economic costs could have been in terms of lost loans and the psychological costs could have been in humiliation at the international level.

Giving a 'face saving' option to Pakistan besides being a betrayal of the sacrifices of our jawans proved disastrous for the future.

Does this mean that India should have escalated the conflict to a general war?

The firm answer to this is NO.

Yet between all out war and defensive action on our side of the LoC, there are many creative options that could have been used.

But such has been the stranglehold on the policy makers of the Delhi 'Peace Lobby' that strategic thinking in India had been reduced to the chanting of well worn mantras.

A most favoured one was 'Pakistan's survival is in Indian interest' or 'conventional war between India and Pakistan has become redundant'.

Circumscribed by such mantras that provide the framework and basic premises, Indian strategic thinking had got into a rut.

Clauswitz had often said that strategic matters are simple but not necessarily easy!

What Kargil had demonstrated is that Pakistan is quite capable of starting a war that it is bound to lose.

The politico-bureaucratic establishment in Delhi did not appear to have thought through this issue. The slogan 'there is no alternative to peace' had lulled our thinking into inaction.

The belief in Pakistan's ultimate triumph (Gazwa e Hind) is quite consistent with occasional withdrawal (as in Kargil) and attempts to fill every power vacuum through the ISI's activities.

India had no choice but to develop a strategy of employment of force that is technologically superior, causes disproportionate damage on the enemy and is still short of all out war.

It is this precise change that came about in our approach after the Uri and Pulwama attacks that has led to relative peace between the two countries.

At that time many of us feared that at some future date Pakistan may well launch or place a nuclear weapon in India and claim that it is an action by the mujaheedin.

India may well then launch a devastating strike against Pakistan and reduce it to radioactive dust, but the deterrence would have failed and with it the primary raison d'etre for the nuclear weapons stockpile would become redundant.

Assured punitive action is at the heart of nuclear strategies. India has ignored this basic principle at its own peril.

It took us 20 years to learn this basic lesson of nuclear deterrence when we launched the air strike on Balakot in 2019. It is only then that we completed the circle that began on the icy heights of Kargil in 1999.

The sacrifices of our brave soldiers were truly honoured only in February 2019.

Colonel Anil A Athale (retd) is a military historian whose earlier columns can be read here.

Feature Presentation: Ashish Narsale/Rediff.com