India and Japan are natural partners at sea, and Narendra Modi's recent visit underlined the need to keep the association going
One of the important constituents of the joint statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan was the reference to enhanced maritime security cooperation between the two countries, and the continuation of trilateral naval exercises at sea between the navies of India, Japan and the United States. There are other significant elements in that document, principally the Japanese offer of $35 billion in development assistance over the next five years -- as also the disappointment that a civil nuclear agreement could not be reached -- but the purpose here is to look at security issues in somewhat greater detail.
Following the Soviet ingress into Afghanistan in 1980 and India’s understated but clear support to the then USSR, Japan was the first country to condemn our stance. Through the 1980s, bilateral relations remained cool. Starting in the early 1990s, things began to move positively albeit slowly; but the nuclear tests of 1998 stopped this interface as Japan joined others in imposing severe sanctions. There was no interaction between the navies at any level except notionally. In 2001, the Indian Navy held an International Fleet Review in Mumbai, but no ship of the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force was present. Even political interaction was lacklustre.
It was in this background that an Indian Track-II organisation, the Indian Ocean Society, headed by the late Vice Admiral MK Roy, began its first interactions with a Japanese counterpart, the Ship Ocean Foundation chaired by a former vice-minister of defence, Masahiro Akiyama, in 2004. Though essentially maritime, the dialogue inevitably covered other issues. Thus a former foreign secretary, the late S K Singh, was on the Indian team just as the other side included a former chairman of their Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the second meeting, Prithviraj Chavan -- then minister in the prime minister’s Office -- flew in to join the discussions, while the Japanese fielded a former defence minister, Shigeru Ishiba. Progress in these talks was marginal. In keeping with India’s strategy for security cooperation, the focus was on initiating bilateral interaction between the two navies while the other side was clearly hesitant to participate in such ventures. The Japanese constitution was repeatedly cited as a barrier to such cooperation with any others save military allies - read the US and Australia. They would be happy to join interactions which included one or both of the others, but not anything directly bilateral.
These inputs were provided to the government and not long thereafter the ‘infamous’ Quadrilateral Malabar (otherwise a US-India bilateral) exercise was conducted in the Bay of Bengal with navies of India, USA, Japan and Australia participating. It invited a sharp adverse comment from China; the then Indian defence minister was himself not supportive and that was the first and last of such interfaces. A bilateral India-Japan exercise at sea was still not in sight but the Track-II dialogue continued.
In 2006, Shinzo Abe visited India as prime minister, and it was evident that he carried a more positive brief -- but he resigned soon thereafter. Fortunately, his successor, Taro Aso, remained supportive. In the return visit made by Manmohan Singh in 2008, the joint declaration included as many as three full paragraphs on the need to enhance maritime security cooperation between the two navies, including through bilateral exercises and other interactions. Annual defence minister-level visits were also instituted. Ships would visit either country every 12-18 months. Remarkably, throughout this time it was the Track-II interaction that led the governmental face, both being in close sync.
The first India-Japan naval exercise was, unfortunately, cancelled due to the nuclear reactor disaster in Japan but it was rescheduled in 2010 and has now been institutionalised. A US-India-Japan trilateral was scheduled in 2012 and has been repeated just a month ago. A Japanese proposal to sell a US-2 amphibian aircraft to India was made more than a year ago - a significant departure from their earlier inhibited positions on anything remotely military. It is still to be finalised on our side; it has figured in the most recent interaction between the two PMs in which ‘red carpet rather than red tape’ has been assured. Hopefully, this will get it airborne. In the Track-II discussions the need for technology transfer in the defence sector has been stressed but this has yet to move forward; yet, removal of as many as six of our defence research and production entities from their proscribed list, as done now, must be seen as another step forward in this developing relationship.
In short, a great distance has been travelled in the last ten years in developing a strategic and security interface with Japan and this latest meeting is a continuing movement in that direction. Situated where it is at one end of the Indo-Pacific water stretch with India being at the other, Japan must be seen as a ‘natural ally’ of this country, to use a term once used by former Prime Minister Vajpayee for the USA. Its energy needs from the Gulf constitute a core national interest and their safe movement is critical; India is best placed to provide this assurance in the Indian Ocean supply route. Similarly, 35 per cent of India's overseas trade routes run through the waters of the Western Pacific and safe movement of commerce and tranquillity in that region are important concerns.
It is not realised by many that Japan’s conventional naval capabilities are superior to those of China and its technologies, military included, are on a par with the best available globally. The relationship is mutually advantageous to both countries and the fact that both see it that way is reflected in the declaration that has been put out by them.
This leaves China. As the major Asian power it is not possible for India not to engage that country positively and proactively, and relations with Japan do not come in the way. No doubt, there are issues to be resolved, the boundary question in particular; but China is also our second-largest trading partner, albeit in a skewed fashion in which it exports much more to us than it imports.Those are matters which are under discussion but we are also participants in several important multilateral fora. It is for this very reason that an Indian warship was present at the 60th anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Navy in Qing Dao in April this year even as a group of three others visited Sasebo in Japan two months later.
The forthcoming visit of President Xi Jinping to India is as important as the one that the PM has just concluded to Japan. Along with the one that he will make to the USA later this month, this is the real global quadrilateral which India must cope with; and it is strategically well placed to deal with the three other players. At least on this geopolitical stage ‘achche din’ seem to be arriving; to plagiarise an eminent playwright of yore, there is a tide in the affairs of nations which must be taken at the flood. That time is now.
-- The writer retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, and has been involved in Track-II discussions with Japan for the last 10 years
Image: Prime Minister Narendra Modi greets Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his recently-concluded trip to Japan. Photograph: MEA/Flickr
