The hung parliament thrown up by the April 2 general election in Sri Lanka does not augur well for the island nation, or for India.

While officially mouthing the standard 'it's their internal matter' spiel, New Delhi cannot but keep a watchful eye on its southern neighbour, which again faces political and social turmoil.

Despite the bluster of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam -- which now faces its biggest internal challenge in the form of Karuna, a Tamil warlord from the eastern province -- chances of the February 2002 ceasefire between the rebel outfit and the government being called off are bleak.

But so are the chances of the peace process resuming from the point at which it was suspended when the Norwegian team monitoring it walked out last November.

This is because President Chandrika Kumaratunga, whose Freedom Alliance has become the largest group in parliament, though still short of a majority, and her allies have widely divergent views on how to deal with the LTTE.

In February, accusing Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe of conceding too much to the LTTE to keep the peace process alive, Kumaratunga dissolved parliament four years ahead of schedule. (Under the Lankan constitution, the president, who is elected directly, has executive powers, while parliament controls legislation and finance.)

The Norwegian peacemakers pulled out of the process after Kumaratunga sacked three ministers, suspended parliament, and briefly declared a state of emergency.

Wickremesinghe, who was in the US soliciting aid at the time, returned home to a political mess. Subsequent meetings between the two leaders failed, with the president demanding that she be given sole responsibility to deal with the LTTE.

The LTTE, meanwhile, hinted that it might revive its call for secession if the feuding Sinhala politicians did not find common ground on the peace process.

Ironically, both the Tigers and the Lankan government now want to improve ties with India, which burnt its fingers on the island with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in 1987-1990.

Urging India to 'adopt a new, creative approach and initiate friendly relations' with the LTTE, the Tigers' official spokesman and political theoritician, London-based Anton Balasingham, said in December that New Delhi 'should not treat the LTTE as a hostile force. We want friendly relations with India.'

The Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, a Sinhalese nationalist group earlier known for its anti-India -- and anti-LTTE -- position, has also made similar appeals. The JVP, now an electoral ally of Kumaratunga's People's Alliance, had launched a virulent and bloody crusade against the 'Indian occupation' of the island nation in 1989, and sought to violently enforce a boycott of Indian goods.

But it now 'wholeheartedly' endorses the proposed defence pact between India and Sri Lanka. Initially expected to be signed in February, this pact is now likely to be signed after the Indian general election.

In October, Wickremesinghe and his Indian counterpart Atal Bihari Vajpayee had agreed in New Delhi to start talks on the deal, which involves New Delhi supplying Colombo with military equipment -- including helicopter gunships, boats, and various types of armoured and other military vehicles -- and radically increasing the number of Lankan defence forces it trains each year.

This was followed up by a visit by a three-member Sri Lankan delegation led by Defence Secretary Cyril Herath in mid-January to discuss the draft of the pact with Indian officials led by his counterpart, Ajay Prasad.

The proposed pact, which, among other things, calls for India to help strengthen the Palaly air base in LTTE-dominated Jaffna, obviously finds no favour with the Tigers.

The long-term lease of the Trincomalee tank farms, including aviation fuelling facilities, to the Indian Oil Corporation soon after the Norwegian-brokered peace talks began and the ceasefire seemed reasonably secure has also been a source of concern for both India and the LTTE.

India is unwilling to precipitate anything that may jeopardise its growing business interests in Lanka. IOC, which now sells fuel on the island, is planning an IPO of its subsidiary, Lanka IOC, by June to raise about $25 million.

But some LTTE leaders and others in Sri Lanka see this as the thin end of the wedge to convert the island into an 'Indian colony.'

So far, both India -- and the US -- have consistently refused to deal directly with the LTTE, which they have separately proscribed as a 'terrorist outfit.'

In fact, the peace process started unravelling soon after the LTTE was barred from a meeting in New York on aid for Lanka early last year, which was being attended by Indian and US officials.

To top it all, a lot of aid for the island -- whose economy, World Bank officials warn, is headed for a serious slowdown -- is conditional on the resumption of the peace talks.

Though India knows that any overt move on its part would be construed as interference in the island nation's affairs, it cannot but be concerned about the developments there. While publicly endorsing a negotiated peace settlement, many Indian strategists echo President Kumaratunga's fears of too much autonomy being given to the LTTE in the north, which, among other things, might force New Delhi to treat it as a political entity rather than a terrorist group.

Others, however, point out that to be recognised as a political party, the LTTE has to eschew  violence, give up arms, and join the political mainstream. Which would make it a far different outfit from the one that killed former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991.