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The Rediff Special/C Uday Bhaskar

India's Vulnerability Index is not Ghauri-specific

The test-firing of the Ghauri missile by Pakistan on April 6 has focused attention on the Indian subcontinent and the contours of Weapons of Mass Destruction or trans-border military capabilities as prevalent in southern Asia in the post-Cold War period.

Ghauri, according to reports from the Pakistani establishment, is a 1,500-km surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a payload of 700 kg. In a significant nuance, Islamabad claims that this is an indigenous missile, part of the Hatf family, and is classified as Hatf 5. While the provenance of the missile has led to considerable speculation about the possible external supplier, there are certain facts of the case as it were, that cannot be denied.

First, that Pakistan has visibly demonstrated its acquisition of and ability to test-fire a missile of about 1,000-km-plus range. While more is awaited, the US state department has also confirmed the occurrence of such a test, thereby according it the much-needed independent corroboration. This is relevant since Pakistan has in the past claimed certain missile tests -- as on July 3, 1997, with the purported 800-km Hatf 3 -- but this did not elicit such external corroboration.

The test-firing of Ghauri thus operates at three levels of relevance -- the domestic Pakistani compulsion, the relevance for India, and finally the involvement of external factors in Pakistan's missile quest.

Domestically one can discern a pattern in the determination of Islamabad to acquire a certain level of WMD/ trans-border military capability, and this goes back to Pakistan's clandestine quest for nuclear weapons and missile technology whose genesis goes back to the mid-1970s, to the aftermath of the 1971 Bangladesh war.

While the nuclear weapon narrative is out of the scope of this comment, the missile quest is closely inter-linked with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the induction of surface-to-surface missiles a la the Scud in the region.

Claiming that it needed a similar capability to defend itself, Islamabad entered into a close relationship with Beijing in the late 1980s for the acquisition of the M-11 and M-9 series of 300 km and 600 km respectively -- even while laying the foundation for an indigenous missile programme.

This was also the period when China had sold 60 CSS-2 ballistic missiles of 2,500 km range to Saudi Arabia, and between the erstwhile Soviet Union, China and North Korea 12 Asian nations had become missile capable.

By the early 1990s, Islamabad was perceived to be missile capable -- with the M-11 and M-9 -- though there was enormous pressure from Washington, and possibly Beijing not to publicly declare such capability.

The latter constriction was applied due to the prevalence of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime led by the US. Hence Islamabad was unable to display its missile capability as visibly as it may have wished and had to create an edifice of claiming indigenous capability so that the sanctions imposed by US law on China and Pakistan would not come into vogue.

This pattern is evidenced in the nuclear dimension also, where Islamabad first seeks a certain degree of credibility and then attempts to accord this clandestine capability a legitimacy and acceptance by the global community -- particularly the USA.

Thus the Hatf 5/ Ghauri may be analysed along these lines from the domestic perspective of Pakistan. From the pictures flashed on Pakistan television and related reports, it may be acknowledged that Islamabad is now equipped with a missile of about 1,000-km-plus range.

The relevance for India operates at an instructive level. Whereas Islamabad may have been perceived to be missile capable since the early 1990s, this was never unambiguously established or demonstrated -- the semantic choice was to refer to 'uncrated' missiles and the reluctance of the US administration from the days of Secretary of State Warren Christopher to 'arrive at a determination' despite irrefutable evidence from US intelligence agencies.

The Ghauri test testifies, with no room for doubt, that Islamabad now has this capability -- and the reality for the Indian security planner needs little reiteration.

The origin of the missile has a different set of politico-diplomatic consequences that involve the US, China, maybe North Korea and Pakistan. But at the end of the day, while the M-11 and M-9 were kept deliberately hazy, the Ghauri has streaked across the region with the clarity that the information revolution now provides.

Ghauri has had a definitive impact in India but it must be noted that India's Vulnerability Index vis-a-vis missiles is not Ghauri specific.

This VI was a reality in the early 1990s, and what Ghauri has done is to enhance this VI and accord it greater visibility.

The Ghauri thus may be seen as an alert to the Indian psyche and a challenge to be dealt with prudently. The latter entails the kind of holistic strategic defence review that the new government is engaged in with the setting up of a National Security Council et al. And India will have to acquire a strategic profile that will allow it to realise its larger politico-diplomatic objectives.

The popular refrain that a Ghauri must be matched by an Agni may be misleading -- nations acquire and nurture strategic military capabilities, such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in the pursuit of national interests/ aims. And this capability and its inherent persuasive quality need to be exploited with politico-diplomatic acumen.

India has shown considerable reluctance to grapple with this in its own quest for nationhood and hopefully the Ghauri episode will catalyse the Indian response.

At the tertiary level, Ghauri also involves the competing strategic interests of the USA and China and their compulsions in the southern Asian region. The manner in which this will be played out will be known in coming days when senior officials from the Bill Clinton administration will be in the region.

The Rediff Special

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