Commentary / Rajeev Srinivasan

The US has no wish to have India emerge as another superpower in Asia

The US presidential election happens in November of every leap year. It is a spectacle of precedented magnitude; about $800 million will be spent on this year's extravagant media blitz. Unfortunately, the result, to quote eminent social critic Noam Chomsky, is merely the 'manufacturing (of) consent' because the entire production is a matter of form, not content: absolutely nothing of substance is discussed, and the whole thing swings strictly on how well a candidate looks on television.

The differences between the two parties in the US, the Republican and the Democratic, are quite minimal. They are both centrist parties, the Republicans a little to the right of the spectrum and the Democrats a little to the left. But in essence, they both support (and are supported by) Big Business: the military-industrial-media complex and the financial titans of Wall Street.

They both believe in aggressive nationalism, mercantilism and capitalism, and they differ primarily on minute social or economic issues -- level of taxation, or support for abortion rights. The other voices -- those of labour, of environmentalists, of socialists--they are simply not heard. They are represented by minor parties, such as the Green Party, which is running consumer activist Ralph Nader for president, in a quixotic race where Nader himself admits he has no chance of being elected. Another third option, that represented by independent candidates such as John Anderson and Ross Perot, differs from the duopoly only in degree of dogma, not in the central axioms themselves.

What does all this mean for India, and what does the prospect of four more years of President Bill Clinton mean for us? The opinion polls give Clinton a solid ten-point lead over his rival, Senator Bob Dole of the Republican party. Unfortunately for India, neither Clinton nor Dole is a friend of the country, and in summary, it really doesn't make much difference who comes to power.

There is a general belief among Indians that the Democratic party is more sympathetic to India. Perhaps the feeling is based on past history and perception: after all, John Kennedy, a Democrat, (and his ambassador, economist John Kenneth Galbraith) made a good impression by his apparent warmth for India. Furthermore, it was Richard Nixon, a Republican, who sent the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal to bully India during the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971.

Therefore Indians and Indian-Americans had a lot of expectations about Bill Clinton in 1992, especially since Clinton actively suggested that he was Kennedy's spiritual heir. Besides, Clinton's predecessor George Bush, as an old China hand, was noticeably more interested in China (and more tolerant of the China-Pakistan axis) than in India. However, these fond hopes have been belied to a great extent by reality: under Clinton's Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel, policy towards South Asia has generally favoured Pakistan; and of course, the infatuation with China continues.

The US continues to bully India on nuclear and strategic issues: for example the NPT and CTBT fiascos; plus the pressure on the ballistic missile program, on intellectual property issues and on Kashmir. I have no reason to believe that a second Clinton term will be any more positive for India.

The reasons for my scepticism are geopolitics, realpolitik, and economic competition. The United States has a very clear agenda in its foreign policy, which was articulated a while ago by George Kennan, who is credited with inventing the Cold War. Kennan said that the US, which had 8 per cent of the world's population, enjoyed 33 per cent of its resources; its foreign policy was intended to keep things that way! Thus the US is by no means interested in seeing regional powers or superpowers developing that would threaten its ability to control strategic resources.

This explains the US's highly ambivalent response to the Taliban extremists in Afghanistan: The US is very interested in being able to access the immense energy resources in Central Asian republics like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrghizstan (oil, natural gas, gold).

The most obvious route to exploit these reserves would be to build pipelines through Afghanistan to Pakistan's port of Karachi. Besides, it is important to ensure that these resources are not easily accessed by the Iranians or the Chinese. Thus American support for Pakistan and its proxies in Afghanistan.

Similarly, the US views the Indian Ocean as a strategic area in its competition with China and Japan. Much or all of the oil going to China and Japan will pass through the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Straits of Malacca. Thus the importance of the US base at Diego Garcia, and this, also explains the American interest in the Sri Lankan port of Trincomalee, to be a choke point on the economic jugular of Japan/China.

India clearly does not fit into this picture except as an irritant; however, if India were to provide port facilities for the US fleet at Kochi or Vishakhapatnam, the US may be much friendlier to India. Nevertheless, US military planners view India with deep suspicion based on India's earlier friendliness to the Soviet Union, and what they view (rightly) as general animosity towards the US in India. Thus India is not viewed as a reliable ally, unlike Pakistan which has generally served US interests well.

In terms of the global competition, India is less important than China as far as the US is concerned. American companies have invested far more money (perhaps $30 billion) in China than in India. The Chinese were very successful in creating the perception of a huge market (the mouth-watering story of 1.2 billion consumers, no matter most of them are desperately poor!) and a huge pool of low-cost labour.

Now that General Motors and General Electric and IBM and Chrysler and so forth have invested all this money in China, these companies have a significant vested interest in ensuring that US-China relations are good. In fact, there is a US lobbying group funded by these companies that even does PR for China, creating positive media images.

In effect, the US government cannot afford to upset China; hence the elaborate mating dance of threats and counter-threats and finally caving in by the US and some make nice by the Chinese. Unfortunately, India does not have a Fifth Column influencing the US government. Therefore, India cannot expect the US to wink indulgently at India's transgressions as it does for China.

Americans of all political persuasions find India enigmatic, to put it mildly. Despite the recognised fact that India has been anointed a 'Big Emerging Market' by Clinton's team, I believe US strategic planners find it difficult to get over their antipathy based on their view of India as a 'Soviet stooge.'

In point of fact, what they really dislike is the fact that India is not pliable, India is prickly and independent, and India attempts to prevent US capital from treating India like a banana republic that is run by proxy from Wall Street. This is not the US prescription for minor powers, into which category they lump India along with Pakistan.

Neither Clinton nor Dole will change this. In fact, the imbroglio over the CTBT, India's putative nuclear capability, and signs of economic nationalism in India, are viewed with considerable alarm by the US.

The emergence of China as a superpower is threatening enough for the US; they have no wish to have India emerge as another superpower in Asia.

The forecast, then, for US-India relations in the wake of a new US presidency is: Frosty, with little chance of a thaw. In other words, the status quo ante.

Rajeev Srinivasan writes widely on economic and political affairs from San Francisco. He holds an MBA from Stanford and works as marketing director for a multinational computer company in Silicon Valley.

Illustration: Dominic Xavier