New state govts will make no difference

Earlier this week, I spent a couple of days in the company of several civil servants and policemen.

The main topic of discussion, as might be expected, was the Assembly elections. I asked many of them whether it would make any difference if there were a change of government.

All of them, without exception, said it wouldn't. The reason they gave was not the standard one, namely, that all politicians are the same. That, in fact, they said made their lives simpler. It was like batting on the same sort of wickets.

The real problem, according to them, was that there was not enough money in the states for building roads and supplying power (even for half a day) or whatever and that the instruments of government and governance had become completely blunt at the level where delivery takes place. And, of course, there was the all-pervasive corruption.

The more senior amongst them said that in their experience, all new governments wanted to get on with everything that, in their opinion, had cost the previous government the election. Whatever the TV 'experts' might say about tactical voting, this is usually the lack of development.

Or, as Kamal Nath put it so patronisingly and with such breathtaking insouciance, the more you give the people, the more they demand. He might as well have added "bloody ingrates".

So very soon all new chief ministers come up against the two hurdles that eventually cost them, too, the next election: no money and little competence. Incumbency, after all, can guarantee a win only if the government performs. But a good performance requires money and ability, neither of which is available in the requisite measure in state governments any longer.

It also requires them to reject excessive populism and govern with a much firmer hand than their courage would normally allow them to. But contrary to popular impression, said one of the more perceptive civil servants, these days populism and lax governance had become unavoidable substitutes for money and competence.

When chief ministers realise that there is nothing that they can do -- they fall back on populism and the rahne-do-chalne-do formula. It doesn't guarantee a win in the next election but populism gives them something to boast about and the chalta hai attitude buys them peace from rivals in the Opposition -- but even more importantly, perhaps, in their own parties.

The money and competence problem in the states is interlinked and what is worse, the two feed on each other. Very simply, the states employ too many people, of dubious competence. The result is that after paying the salaries and pensions, there is practically nothing left over for infrastructure development.

They spend a lot of money maintaining the levels of incompetence. Hit financially by the 1997 wage revision, Digvijay Singh thought he would turn the disaster to his advantage. Sonia Gandhi had just taken over the Congress party when he was re-elected in 1998 and he thought she would be pleased if he focused on things that were close to her heart, namely, panchayati raj (Rajiv's dream) and the social sector.

He then went on to convince himself that these were adequate substitutes for roads and power. Ajit Jogi, too, was too clever by half but in a different way. He knew he had to counter the anti-conversion campaign of the RSS but thought that this would annoy his boss. The desire to please her cost him the election, just as it did Digvijay Singh. Ashok Gehlot's problem was excessive corruption and the dadagiri at the lowest levels of government. The failure to massage the Jat ego was a tactical error.

They switched allegiance in the manner they have been known to in history. It is no coincidence that in all the states, the most powerful unions are not INTUC or AITUC or BMS. They are the government employees unions. (That is why Jayalalitha went after them). And the irony is that the more government employment that is created, the stronger these unions become.

The state governments commit slow suicide in this most visible way. The praying mantis and the black widow come to mind. Both devour their lovers. In Delhi, where the Congress was expected to win, it was both an exception and not one. It was an exception because a lot of its development was funded or under-written by the Central government. And it was not an exception because much of the good work she did was forced on Sheila Dixit by the Supreme Court.

One only has to recall the way in which the Delhi government had resisted CNG as a fuel for the city buses to see why this is true. As to what next, two questions are uppermost in everyone's mind. The first, whether the next general election will be held before or after the monsoon, will soon be answered.

It will depend, to a large extent on how ready the BJP's allies in the NDA are. Chances are, though, that it will be held before the 2004 monsoon. The temptation to cash in on the current favourable mood will be too great to resist, especially if the BJP can make some deft promises of financial support to the smaller parties in the NDA. The answer to the second question, namely, whether Sonia Gandhi is a liability to the Congress, will require a general election for an answer -- if then.

The first responses to the debacles have been typically servile. Ambika Soni, who oversaw the party in Rajasthan told NDTV that the effort put in by the rest of them was not as much as put in singly by Sonia Gandhi. She has now quit. The truth, when it dawns on the somnolent Congress is different.

It has been staring it in the face at least since 1991: it cannot win on its own and it needs allies to form a coalition. From this follows the second truth. When you seek allies, you do not foist someone who they instinctively distrust just because you don't trust anyone in your own party to lead it.

The only way the Congress can be revived is if it dumps Sonia.

But the Congress is unlikely to see the writing on the wall. It is, as we say, like that only.

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