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In 1998, CoalitionBank of Botswana was facing severe pressure on many fronts. Internally, there was considerable discussion on its raison d'etre. From its inception in 1955 to 1991, its mission was development banking and it was responsible only to the government.
The government's expectations were clear: open more branches, mobilise deposits, support priority sectors and maintain the commercial nature of the operation. The more recent public shareholders measured performance by very different yardsticks such as ROE and stock price appreciation.
With the 1991 economic reforms had come much higher levels of compensation in the market and CoalitionBank remained unable to pay market wages or to effectively discriminate by paying people based on performance. This had led to the migration of some experienced officers to foreign banks and to the new private sector banks.
CoalitionBank's management was quite clear they would like to pay performance-based compensation and hire in specialist skills to fill key emerging needs for seasoned professionals in the areas of treasury and credit risk management as well as information technology.
But, as a public sector company, these options were not fully available to them. As a government owned organisation, though publicly listed, CoalitionBank had to conform to broad policies and strategies laid down by the relevant ministries which, in turn, had to consider the overall situation of all public sector organisations in the country and, more specifically, the overall interests of all the public sector financial institutions, of which CoalitionBank was only one.
These constraints were particularly acute in the areas of hiring, motivating and rewarding people where the government's desire for uniform, industry wide norms and standards often collided with CoalitionBank's needs for improving performance and profitability.
Strong, politically well connected unions at multiple levels was another factor CoalitionBank management had to contend with, not only in deciding what to change but also in implementing those decisions.
Finally, as a repository of public funds and as an institution accountable to Parliament, CoalitionBank was also subject to constant external vigil -- from the Central Investigation Bureau and the Vigilance Commission, which impeded the ability of CoalitionBank managers to take normal business risks since there were few rewards associated with the upside and severe punishment associated with the downside.
Despite these internal and external constraints, the top management of CoalitionBank decided in 1994 to embark on a transformation journey involving radical changes in strategy, structure and systems of the bank.
Recognising that the globalisation of the economy was here to stay, the management chose ManageWell & Co, a firm of strategic management consultants, to work with them in this exercise.
ManageWell & Co worked on a set of major changes that would be required for CoalitionBank to come across as being more focused and customer-oriented, as well as better prepared to weather the turbulence and volatility of an increasingly more open and vibrant economy.
ManageWell & Co addressed the following issues:
~ Improving decision-making speed in the area of credit approvals.
~ Acquisition or development of specialised skills in risk management in the credit and treasury areas.
~ Identification of the individual and small business as important markets.
~ Increased ability to be customer-responsive and to customise products.
The robustness of bureaucracy
Despite the pejorative connotation it has acquired in every day use, the term 'bureaucracy' refers to a way of organising and managing large establishments that has proven to be particularly efficient and robust. In this technical sense, CoalitionBank was indeed a bureaucracy that allowed it to be the best public sector bank in the country despite the pressures and constraints placed upon it.
It had continued to grow in size and provide improved returns to its shareholders. This admirable performance had been achieved by managing head count more aggressively, and through better focus on non-performing assets, better targeting of the 40% of its portfolio that had to be lent to the priority sectors (focusing on niches including floriculture and hi-tech agriculture), better development of its unique rural and semi-urban franchise and a continuation of its slow but robust management system, with numerous checks and balances.
In addition, CoalitionBank continued to attract many of the brightest officers who applied for the public sector banking entrance exam and it provided an organised process of socialisation and a structured career path with modest amounts of on-going training.
Over time, this process had led to a very homogenous output of above average, well-rounded bankers who could deal with a wide range of issues and were able to maintain the status quo without too much difficulty.
The benefits of a very homogenous officer cadre lay in the organisation not becoming overly dependent on any one person as there were 'clones' always waiting in the wings. Also, similar interests and concerns resulted in a good sense of camaraderie, good teamwork and a 'can do' attitude.
The diverse experience in terms of types of business and locations provided a very broad exposure to CoalitionBank officers and allowed for the development and application of individual initiative within the boundaries of a fairly bureaucratic system.
This 'can do' attitude was very impressive in its better moments and CoalitionBank probationers and junior officers were brought up on a diet of stories such as how the Mizoram branch had to be completed by a certain date:
". . . we were on schedule to open the branch as planned until we discovered that the safe door had not arrived and there was no motorable road to bring in the door on time. After considerable thought and worry, we arranged to place the door on a large wooden raft and had an elephant haul it through water and across land to the branch location. We completed the branch on time."
The management pipeline of CoalitionBank was fed by Probationary Officers who joined in the officer cadre and Trainee Officers who were promoted from the ranks. The average career path upto middle management was as follows:
Another factor that contributed to CoalitionBank's remarkable internal homogeneity was the management's inability to link compensation to performance or any significant reward/ punishment system. This resulted in a sense of equality among most officers but inhibited the best from shining.
Managers tended to rate all their direct reports as either a 1 or 2, which corresponded to excellent or very good. Often this was inconsistent with their real view of the performance of an individual, but it was done nevertheless, for reasons such as:
~ 'If I give him anything lower, he will not be eligible to be promoted or to get an extension when he nears retirement.'
~ 'I have higher standards then others and expect more from my officers. It would be unfair to penalise my officers because I have high standards.'
~ 'I am a good manager of people and have a good track record in motivating people and getting the best out of them. So, all my officers do an excellent job.'
ManageWell & CoThe consultants observed that the bank had entered the era of deregulation with a strong capital base and an expense-to-income ratio comparable to world class banks. However, on financial performance and market share, much needed to be done.
With an ROA of 0.22% (1993-94), the bank lagged behind private sector banks (1.3%), foreign banks (3.2%) and other world class banks (1.12%). Even some of the other public sector banks had overtaken CoalitionBank. In terms of market share of deposits, CoalitionBank had declined from 25% to 20% over the preceding five years.
In the absence of suitable corrective measures, the competition would chip away at CoalitionBank's deposit base as well as the better quality high value assets, putting severe pressure on the bank's profitability.
Along with slippages in financial performance, customer service standards were also on the decline. The combination of a lack of customer focus and an indifferent attitude could drive away a large part of the bank's customers. Customer surveys had warned management not to take customer loyalty for granted.
The prevailing organisation structure was based on principles appropriate to the economic situation anticipated at that time. Over the decades, many modifications had been made to deal with emerging problems or to provide career opportunities to the growing numbers of staff.
These modifications did not necessarily add value taken holistically and the structure had lost a lot of its original compactness. It had, therefore, become necessary to review the structure and refine it to optimise the functioning of the bank.
At the same time, ManageWell & Co also identified a number of attractive business opportunities that were available to CoalitionBank:
~ To retain and nurture high value corporate customers who contributed substantially to the banks profitability
~ To take advantage of the new opportunities that were emerging in the areas of leasing and project finance
~ To develop a mid-market business based on the financing of mid-sized companies
~ To focus on opportunities for mortgage lending as well as consumer durable finance. Also, to develop a business around travel related cards
~ To fully capitalise on CoalitionBank's branch network for deposit mobilisation, especially its unique position in rural and semi-urban areas
~ To better utilise the well-trained, skilled and innovative manpower resources available within CoalitionBank, a distinctive competence in the industry
~ To better leverage the international network as the basis for a sound international business strategy
ManageWell & Co's revised strategyTaking into account CoalitionBank's background and its position in the economy as well as its various strengths, ManageWell & Co concluded that its client had the potential to become a world class bank.
However, to achieve this goal, CoalitionBank would have to reframe its vision, reformulate its objectives and goals and put in place strategies, systems and structures that were appropriate to the changing environment and the new opportunities that were available.
With the onset of liberalising policies for the economy and the resulting impact on the growth of the capital markets, non-banking sources of funds for corporates and heightened competition for consumer deposits, CoalitionBank needed to focus on competitive strategies such as cost leadership, product differentiation and improved focus on customer segments. This was less relevant in the highly regulated environment the bank had been accustomed to in the past.
CoalitionBank also needed to develop focus around important sub-segments in the market, to provide them with more market oriented and competitive services.
The bank needed to establish Strategic Business Units to deal with specific business opportunities around customer groups or business activities. Recognising the realities of the scale of CoalitionBank's business and the market, the SBU concept was dovetailed by ManageWell & Co into the bank's existing Local Head Office structure.
Some SBUs had to, however, be created outside the LHO structure because of the distinct requirements of those businesses.
Business Groups: ManageWell & Co proposed that the SBUs be grouped under a few business groups based on close linkages and synergies relating to dealings with the same or inter-related customers. The business groups would be headed by senior managers in the rank of Deputy Managing Director or above who would have full profit and loss responsibility along with a high level of autonomy over human and capital resources.
In response, CoalitionBank established the following Business Groups:
1. Corporate Banking: This group consisted of the Corporate Accounts Group, the Leasing SBU and the Project Finance SBU. Collectively, they were expected to focus on the growing and diverse needs of large corporate customers. The CAG formed the cornerstone of this strategy and was aimed at servicing the top 150 corporate accounts.
An additional enhancement was the creation of Account Management Teams to service these top 150 accounts, supported operationally by CAG branches. CoalitionBank established CAG branches at select major cities. AMTs were expected to ensure customer satisfaction through close relationship management and by providing sophisticated and competitive products comparable with the best in the market.
Further, AMT's operated a delayered credit approval process, with proposals being sent directly to the Central Office Credit Committee.
The deregulated environment was expected to provide opportunities for handling large infrastructural projects. Exploitation of these opportunities required product knowledge and product development skills, corporate advisory expertise and financial structuring skills. CoalitionBank expected to handle such projects all the way from the project appraisal stage, to the syndicating of loans/leases.
Recognising this, the project finance and leasing units were expected to work very closely with its merchant banking subsidiary, and its international division and other foreign offices in key financial centres.
The operational processing of project finance and leasing transactions was expected to be handled by the CAG and National Banking Group branches.
2. National Banking Group: This group was expected to cover mid size corporates, high value small scale industries, hi-tech agriculture and high net worth individuals in the Personal Banking sector.
While it could provide a broad array of banking services, a principal thrust area for the NBG was deposit mobilisation from the rural, semi-urban and urban areas. In addition, the group handled business done on behalf of the central and state governments, the Central Federal Bank, financial and non-financial institutions, development banking including government sponsored lending as well as small-scale industries and the agricultural sector.
3. International Banking: This business group covered activities at the foreign branches of CoalitionBank and was responsible for servicing the international banking requirements of domestic customers.
Changes planned in this area included:
~ To start servicing foreign companies with business in the country
~ To focus foreign offices away from sovereign lending and local overseas business, towards domestic related business and investment flows into the country
~ To start providing correspondent banking business within the country by leveraging the foreign branch network and CoalitionBank's foreign correspondent banks
4. Associates and Subsidiaries: CoalitionBank had equity interests in a wide range of institutions, such as associate banks, CoalitionBank Mutual Fund, CoalitionBank Factors, CoalitionBank Housing Finance and others. For the associate banks, the consultants recommended that these should be merged with CoalitionBank and this proposal was under consideration by the government.
For the subsidiaries, the intent was for CoalitionBank to behave as a holding company and allocate resources based on an overall assessment of the profitability, risk and capital requirements of each unit. CoalitionBank would negotiate financial and performance standards with each unit through a Memorandum of Understanding and exercise strategic control through the Board and minimise routine operational involvement.
5. Personal Banking Group: This group would be created with three SBUs, namely Consumer Finance, Mortgage Finance and Credit Cards. In 1998, this group was under development and had been placed under the temporary supervision of the NBG.
Revised Structure: Beyond reshaping the CoalitionBank organisation around the SBUs and Business Groups, ManageWell & Co recommended some additional organisational changes. It proposed a lean and integrative corporate centre that would focus on long term planning and policy issues, with no active role in day-to-day operations.
The centre would add value to the businesses primarily by helping them to share and leverage corporate resources across business groups. In response to this proposal, CoalitionBank had established an apex structure consisting of:
~ The Chairman and CEO
~ Four senior staff officers at the Corporate Office (DMD and Corporate Development Officer, DMD and Chief Financial Officer, DMD and Chief Credit Officer, and DMD Inspection and Audit)
~ Four business groups heads (MD and Group Executive-Corporate Banking Group, MD and Group Executive-National Banking Group, DMD Associates and Subsidiaries and DMD International Banking)
~ In addition, the Chief Vigilance Officer would also report to the Chairman.
The structure at the zonal level under the NBG was revised. The Local Head Office was now headed by a Chief General Manager and supported by three DGMs to oversee issues of policy and strategy in the areas of financial management, credit management and personnel and services.
These three DGMs were designated as zonal financial officer, zonal credit officer and zonal development officer. Two branch network headquarters were established under each CGM: one each for commercial banking, and development & personal banking.
The network GMs were supported by business planners, and the regional AGMs were supported by sales planners.
No changes were recommended by ManageWell & Co at the branch level. These would be considered later.
Key Management Processes: ManageWell & Co also recommended changes in several key management processes of CoalitionBank and, by 1997, these recommendations had led to some significant changes within the bank.
1. Credit Process: The credit process consisted of a pre-sanction process and a post-sanction process.
In the past every official who was part of the administrative channel participated in the credit sanctioning process without a clear sense of the value-addition and accountability at each level. Depending on the type of credit and the amount involved, clear accountabilities and authorities were established for the appraisal and recommendations, assessment and sanction stages of the pre-sanction process.
In the post-sanction area, the stages were defined as follow-up, supervision and monitoring, and control. Once again accountabilities were clearly defined and identified with specific management positions for each of these tasks. Additionally, the various stages in the two credit processes were documented and circulated to the operating units to specify responsibility areas at the designated levels.
In the past, credit approval was very slow and cumbersome resulting in very significant delays of upto six months. A very substantial delayering of the credit process had been made to reduce the number of levels involved from a previous maximum of 20 to a new maximum of four. This had been done by increasing sanctioning powers at various levels and also through the introduction of new credit committees at the circle level.
~ Zonal GM: Rs 50 mn
~ Zonal Credit Committee (ZGM + 2 GMs + Zonal Credit Officer): Rs 75 mn
~ Local Zonal Board of Directors: Rs 100 mn
~ Executive Committee of Central Board of Directors (meets twice a week): over Rs100 mn
A further enhancement planned would eliminate the role of the Zonal Board and send all credits upto Rs 2.5 bn to a Central Credit Committee. All credits for amounts in excess of that would continue to go to the Executive Committee of the Central Board.
CoalitionBank had also established a Risk Management Department that was responsible for creating a risk point system to allow management to view the portfolio by class of risk.
The thumb-rule was that new exposure could be booked in the category of RR 1-5. In March 1998, 70% of CoalitionBank's portfolio was risk rated 1-3 and management had set a target for 90% to be risk rated 1-3 establishing prudential limits on a portfolio basis and monitoring outstanding to ensure adherence establishing portfolio limits by industry and sector
A Credit Audit system had been formulated to cover all credits of Rs 50 mn and above. All such advances were independently re-assessed soon after they were sanctioned to evaluate the credit assessment and appraisal and to quickly institute remedial measures where necessary. The Credit Audit ensured that various stages of the credit process were properly followed, so confidence in the new credit process could be enhanced.
2. Financial Management Function: A number of functions that were earlier performed by the Central Federal Bank were now required to be performed by the individual organisations themselves. Also, prudential controls were an essential condition for operating in a deregulated market. These factors, along with the need for a strong financial management system in the more dynamic and volatile markets, dictated a need for the following major components of the financial management function:
~ Strategic Planning and Strategic Management
~ Performance Management
~ Asset-Liability Management
~ Management of Treasury risks
~ Compliance Systems and Monitoring
~ Management of relations with shareholders and other related agencies
While performance planning continued on an annual cycle, the parameters were changed. The objective was to understand the real profitability of each of the major business groups for better allocation of resources. With this in view, the Transfer Pricing Systems had been re-aligned as follows:
Deposits: Treasury paid 3% on current account balances to the concerned segment/ branch. This was retained by the segment/ branch who paid 0% to the customer. Treasury paid 110% of the average deposit rate paid to customers on other balances. This allowed a margin for the concerned branch/ segment. The rural network received a slightly larger incentive.
Assets: Treasury retained 10% of the cost of the loan to a customer on corporate/ commercial loans. Treasury retained 50% of the interest received from SSI customers. Treasury retained 52% of the interest received from retail consumer clients. Branches/ Segments paid 4% to the Treasury as a funding cost on NPAs.
The bank had established an Asset-Liability Committee to examine the mix of the bank's assets and liabilities on an on-going basis and lay down policies for managing the risk. The ALCO was supported by an ALCO support group to assemble information on the direction of the economy, expected behaviour of interest rates as well as information on the composition of the bank's various businesses from a new system that was in the process of being implemented.
The day-to-day management of rupee balances from a liquidity point of view and the bank's strategy in the rupee money market was the responsibility of the Domestic Treasury Department under the NBG. Foreign currency balances and foreign exchange services were the responsibility of the Foreign Treasury Department under the International Banking Group.
Recognising the on-going integration of the money and exchange markets, CoalitionBank management was examining the issue of integration of the domestic and foreign treasuries.
3. Technology: In an increasingly competitive environment, technology was expected to play the role of a critical competitive tool. While CoalitionBank was a pioneer in the use of computerisation, initiatives in this area had remained scattered and it was felt necessary to integrate them into a coherent technology strategy. The bank was developing a long term vision and organisation for technology so as to position itself for leadership in the future. It was also looking beyond transaction processing and towards utilising technology for product development and improved product delivery.
4. Human Resource Management: The quality, commitment and motivation level of employees were obviously critical factors for the organisation.
One of the key strategic objectives for the business groups was identified as enhancing employee involvement, skills and productivity. During the consultancy exercise, it had become apparent that the bank needed to change its approach to human resources management that was characterised by excessive centralisation, inadequate policy focus and lack of differentiation.
While the need for change was recognised, some aspects of personnel management required further examination. The bank was constrained by industry wide agreements and, while the need for operational autonomy for public sector banks had been recognised by the government, policy measures for achieving this objective were awaited.
Nevertheless, the following changes had been implemented in this area:
~ The position of a Corporate Development Officer in the rank of a DMD had been created at the Corporate Centre to deal with policy matters in the areas of human resources, industrial relations and technology
~ A high powered Human Resources Committee had been established at the corporate level to deal with policy aspects of critical HR issues such as manpower planning, placement policy, promotion policy, specialisation, career path planning and training
~ Important areas such as placement of senior executives was handled by the Central Management Committee
~ Wide ranging decentralisation of decision making in human resources management was in the process of implementation
5. Top Management Forums: While each member of the senior management team had a well defined area of responsibility, there were lots of issues which affected the bank as a whole, over and beyond the impact on any specific group/ function. A set of top management committees had been formed to exploit synergies and to ensure that different parts of the bank did not work at cross purposes.
Implementation: ManageWell & Co completed their study and provided their recommendation in 1995. It was earlier envisaged that ManageWell & Co would work with CoalitionBank through the next stage and help in implementing these recommendations. However, CoalitionBank management decided that it would be most effective to hand over the task of implementing these recommendations to its internal Organisation and Planning Department. This department reported into the Corporate Development Office.
Challenges facing CoalitionBankWhile the changes in the environment as well as greater sensitivity within the bank had improved CoalitionBank's awareness of changing customer needs and demands as well as growing competitive pressures, there remained a certain ambiguity about the basic purpose of the bank.
Sense of purpose: As part of the ManageWell & Co restructuring exercise, the top management of CoalitionBank had met together to debate and agree on a 'Vision Statement' for the bank. Interestingly, one of the most heavily debated issues was the congruence of its old role in development banking, with its new aspirations as a large and powerful financial institution that was looking to re-invent itself and be managed for profit and shareholder wealth.
The bank's senior management recognised the need for a departure from development banking as its raison d'etre. But, without development banking, what was CoalitionBank?
The old logic of being the agent of Central Federal Bank and a tool of social and economic development was clear. What was the new logic?
Senior managers felt that they had to adopt a new philosophy, based on creation of shareholder wealth. The employees at the operating levels of CoalitionBank were not part of the debate and, for them, life continued unchanged with development banking as an important part of the bank's core purpose and role in the country.
After a long and emotional debate, it was agreed that 'Development Banking' was inconsistent with its new objectives and, while the bank would continue to play a role in development banking, this must not be part of the vision statement. Given the historical role of development banking as the bedrock of CoalitionBank's culture, this conclusion was reached amidst much anguish.
As a public sector entity, CoalitionBank felt it needed approval of its new vision from the government before adopting it internally and communicating it to external stakeholders. At the last moment before sending the vision statement to the government, the chairman decided to include Development Banking in the vision statement.
Moving onto the choice of customers and markets, whom should CoalitionBank serve and in what way?
Through its actions, CoalitionBank was moving towards being all things to all people. It was building expertise in corporate banking, merchant banking and increasingly in consumer banking. Recognising that the more desirable individual customers preferred to deal with a bank with a friendly face, a nice ambience and good service, CoalitionBank was setting up a whole series of new dedicated branches. So, a customer could go to a corporate branch, a commercial branch or a specialist high net worth consumer branch. With 8888 branches and 250,000 employees, CoalitionBank had a large amount of resources dedicated to each of these efforts. Should this approach of trying to do everything for everyone continue?
With a relatively high cost structure, CoalitionBank had to look carefully at revenue/ expense trade-offs in due course if it was committed to improving shareholders' returns. This raised the issue of how revenues and expenses were measured and allocated to different business activities. The existing method for measuring revenues described earlier were viewed by many as flawed and in need for change.
Most importantly, what were CoalitionBank's competitive strengths? Where should it focus as it tracked the financial performance of each of its many diverse business areas?
New processes within CoalitionBank: The period since 1994 had seen considerable discussion and debate on the key processes necessary to cope with a more demanding customer base and greater competition.
Many of these had been highlighted in the ManageWell & Co recommendations, most of which were under implementation. The quality and effectiveness of the implementation process, however, were not clear. For example, a fundamental reengineering of the work flow was usually a pre-condition for exploiting full benefits from automating a branch. As of FY98, CoalitionBank had 1,100 computerised branches, and this was more than all the other public sector banks put together and a source of considerable pride and satisfaction within senior management. The target was to automate 2,500 branches by December 1999.
However, computerisation or automation in this context meant a computerised general ledger system and not really the full automation of all products offered by the branch. Also, the branches were not networked. So, instead of updating a manual accounting record, employees updated a computerised record. Computerisation had not led to the implementation of a new workflow system and had not led to a restructuring of the personnel requirements within the branch. In fact, most of these branches remained overstaffed, with certain employees designated to work on a computer, and they were typically less than half of the total employees in a branch.
The credit process was seen as a big handicap in servicing customers before the ManageWell & Co study. It was seen as being too slow and cumbersome. In 1998, the reviews were mixed. In theory, the new systems and structures designed by ManageWell & Co should have resulted in credit approvals and disbursements within two to four weeks from the initial request. This was not happening and indeed in at least some parts of the organisation, credit approvals had become slower than they were previously. This reflected a conversion of a system that relied on individual initiative to a more systematised approach.
People: For the senior managers at CoalitionBank, the ManageWell & Co study represented an important benchmark and they talked in terms of pre-ManageWell & Co and post-ManageWell & Co periods.
However, it was a very different picture at the level of clerical and junior officers. The officers were aware of some of the perceived risks to CoalitionBank which had triggered the ManageWell & Co study, but they did not clearly understand the impact of the ManageWell & Co conclusions, or even how things were changing at CoalitionBank. Clericals were frankly unconcerned about ManageWell & Co or any other study and did not really believe that there were any external threats to CoalitionBank. They associated considerable prestige with being CoalitionBank employees and were proud of their association.
Most middle managers saw CoalitionBank as a company with tremendous strength and capabilities. However, most of them did not see any significant changes developing. Others lamented the lack of any stretch goals " there is no stretch. We accept the results as is. We know what is wrong and where the shoe pinches, but nobody is doing anything about it at senior levels. Seniors have many constraints."
CoalitionBank was seen as being a very caring company, and there were various examples of how this large behemoth responded rapidly to help or accommodate individual employees. There were several examples of the bank coming up with the money to pay for necessary medical costs well beyond the entitlement of the employees concerned. There were others of how senior managers assigned to overseas offices offered the use of the bank car and driver to the visiting family of junior officers assigned to the branch.
These gestures -- big and small -- made CoalitionBank a humane and compassionate employer. This, along with the opportunity for a lifelong career and the still considerable prestige associated with CoalitionBank made it a desirable employer for young recruits who were of above average ability. The hi-fliers and specialists ended up working with other companies in financial services and other industries, where they sensed more personal opportunity, a differentiated compensation plan and limited bureaucracy. Once these above average individuals grew within the bank and became middle managers, some of the initial exuberance tended to wear off as they come to terms with working within a very large, powerful but fairly bureaucratic company.
Issues and QuestionsHas ManageWell & Co dealt with the right issues? How appropriate are their recommendations? What, if anything, have they missed? Has the bank used ManageWell & Co most effectively?
What is the future of CoalitionBank? What should be its raison d'etre?
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